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REDEFINING “PARTICULARLY SERIOUS CRIMES” IN 
REFUGEE LAW
Mary Holper?
Abstract
Refugees are not protected from deportation if they have been 
convicted of a “particularly serious crime” (PSC) which renders them a 
danger to the community. This raises questions about the meaning of 
“particularly serious” and “danger to the community.” The Board of 
Immigration Appeals, Attorney General, and Congress have interpreted 
PSC quite broadly, leaving many refugees vulnerable to deportation 
without any consideration of the risk of persecution in their cases. This 
trend is disturbing as a matter of refugee law, but it is even more 
disturbing because it demonstrates how certain criminal law trends have 
played out in immigration law. This Article offers an explanation for the 
PSC expansion, the “mistrusting criminal judges effect:” Attorney 
General Ashcroft and the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) 
eliminated the criminal sentence as a relevant factor from the test set forth 
in the 1982 seminal case on PSC, Matter of Frentescu, which is part of 
an increasing mistrust of criminal court judges in immigration law. This 
PSC trend mirrors a trend occurring within the criminal justice system; 
namely, the “severity revolution” of the 1980’s and 90’s, where attention 
shifted away from rehabilitating the individual offender and toward 
minimizing the risks presented by certain classes of offenders. The 
severity revolution, which was reflected in immigration law during the 
1990’s and 2000’s, allowed “tough on crime” mentality to outweigh the 
humanitarian aspects of the 1980 Refugee Act, where the term PSC first 
was introduced into U.S. immigration law. This Article seeks to expose 
this troubling trend in PSC law and proposes that the term include only 
violent crimes against persons where the offender has served a significant 
sentence.
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INTRODUCTION
The issue of which refugees present a danger to the U.S. community 
has been at the forefront of the news. Sympathy for the plight of Syrian 
refugees in the summer and fall of 2015 was quickly drowned out by a 
call for strict controls on refugees following the Paris terrorist attacks and 
San Bernardino shootings of late 2015, which culminated in President 
Trump issuing a series of Executive Orders in 2017 that banned all Syrian 
nationals from entering the U.S. and temporarily suspended refugee 
admissions.1 The conversation has focused almost exclusively on who 
                                                                                                                     
1. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017); Exec. Order No. 
13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Deborah Amos, For Refugees and Advocates, an 
Anxious Wait for Clarity on Trump’s Policy, NPR (Nov. 15, 2016, 4:43 AM), 
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should be blocked from entering the United States. This Article explores 
a question that nobody has asked: for noncitizens who already are in the 
United States and seek protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
what types of behaviors render them a danger to the community? 
Specifically, if a noncitizen has been convicted of a crime in the United 
States, what types of crimes should bar someone from refugee protection?
In seeking to answer this question, this Article explores the term PSC, 
which is a bar to refugee protection under both U.S. and international law. 
This Article examines the evolution of the PSC bar to refugee protection 
in U.S. law, which, since its introduction in 1980, has broadened to sweep 
in numerous crimes, leaving many noncitizens vulnerable to deportation 
without any consideration of their claims to refugee protection. This 
Article proposes a PSC definition that includes only violent crimes, i.e., 
those involving actual or threatened physical injury to a person, where 
the noncitizen served a significant sentence, for example, five years. The 
PSC bar exists to protect the public from dangerous individuals; because 
this is a central goal of criminal law, criminal law’s focus on the 
inviolability of the body should inform PSC determinations.2 Also,
deporting the violent offender actually protects the U.S. community from 
a dangerous individual, since that person will physically be unable to 
commit a violent crime against a person from abroad. Limiting PSCs to 
those who served significant sentences provides appropriate deference to 
the criminal sentencing judge, who already has examined the facts and 
circumstances of the crime at issue and decided whether this person is a 
danger to the community. This proposal also presents a commonsense 
solution that is faithful to the plain meaning of the statute, since the word 
“crime” has two modifiers, “particularly” and “serious.” 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/11/15/502010346/for-refugees-and-advocates-an-
anxious-wait-for-clarity-on-trumps-policy (“During the campaign, Trump said he planned to 
suspend the Syrian refugee program, and threatened to deport those already here.”); Eleanor 
Goldberg, After Syrian Boy Drowns, Donations Pour in to Help Refugees and Migrants,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/syrian-boy-
drowns-donations_us_55e8a0b0e4b0b7a9633c5915; David M. Herszenhorn & Michael D. Shear, 
Republicans Call for Halt to Syrian Refugee Program, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/us/politics/paul-ryan-calls-for-halt-to-syrian-refugee-
program.html. There have been several rounds of litigation concerning President Trump’s three 
executive orders. See Maryellen Fullerton, Trump, Turmoil, and Terrorism: The U.S. Immigration 
and Refugee Ban, 29 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 327, 327–38 (2017); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court 
Allows Trump Travel Ban to Take Effect, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-supreme-court.html.
2. See Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 571, 611 
(2011) (citing THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 138 (George Routledge & Sons, 2d ed. 1886)
(1651)).
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To explain why PSC has broadened beyond recognition, thus 
necessitating this proposal, this Article suggests a theory for why 
nonviolent crimes have become PSCs, which I name the “mistrusting 
criminal judges effect.” Attorney General John Ashcroft and the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (Board) eliminated the criminal sentence as a 
relevant factor from the test set forth in the 1982 seminal case on PSC, 
Frentescu3; this is part of an increasing mistrust of criminal court judges 
in immigration law. This trend is disturbing as a matter of refugee law, 
but it is even more disturbing because it demonstrates how certain 
criminal law trends have played out in immigration law. More 
specifically, the PSC evolution mirrors the “severity revolution” of the 
1980s and ’90s, where attention shifted away from rehabilitating the 
individual offender and toward minimizing the risks presented by certain 
classes of offenders.4
This Article builds on scholarship concerning the convergence of 
criminal and immigration law (dubbed “crimmigration”).5 While many 
have written on various topics within the field of crimmigration,6 and 
                                                                                                                     
3. 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982) (requiring the judge to consider “[1] the nature 
of the conviction, [2] the circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction, [3] the type of 
sentence imposed, and, most importantly, [4] whether the type and circumstances of the crime 
indicate that the alien will be a danger to the community” when determining whether a crime is a 
PSC), superseded in part by statute, Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 
4978, as recognized in C-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529 (B.I.A. 1992).
4. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through 
Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 832–33 (2000); Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning 
Government: Explaining America’s Severity Revolution, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 217, 219 (2001).
5. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign 
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 377 (2006).
6. See, e.g., CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW (2015); 
SOCIAL CONTROL AND JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF FEAR (Maria João Guia et al. eds., 
2013); Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and 
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1890 (2007); Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration 
Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement Tools in the “War” on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY 
L.J. 1059, 1060 (2002); Ingrid Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1284 
(2010); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1457, 
1458; Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-
September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 640 (2004); Daniel 
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws 
Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1891 (2000); Stephen H. Legomsky, A New Path of 
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
469, 471 (2007); Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer 
Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 671 (1997); Teresa A. Miller, 
Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 82 (2005) [hereinafter Miller, Blurring the Boundaries]; Teresa A. Miller, 
Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 611, 613 (2003) [hereinafter Miller, Citizenship & Severity]; Stumpf, supra note 5, at 377.
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others have focused primarily on refugee protection,7 there has been 
surprisingly little written about the PSC bar to refugee protection,8 where 
crimmigration law meets refugee law. PSC law is also an increasingly 
important topic as we see more claims for refugee protection marked dead 
on arrival—denied based on a PSC conviction before the noncitizen can 
even present the facts of his or her persecution to an immigration judge. 
This Article seeks to fill that gap in the literature.
Part I of this Article describes the history of the PSC bar, which is 
taken from the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (Refugee Convention)9 and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (Refugee Protocol),10 to which the United States
acceded in 1968.11 Part I also discusses the various U.S. statutes 
implementing this bar to protection under refugee law and foundational 
Board cases interpreting the PSC bar. Part II describes key cases 
                                                                                                                     
7. See, e.g., Deborah Anker et al., Women Whose Governments Are Unable or Unwilling 
to Provide Reasonable Protection from Domestic Violence May Qualify as Refugees Under 
United States Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 709, 741–43 (1997); Anjum Gupta, The New 
Nexus, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 377, 380 (2014); Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences? 
Divorcing Refugee Protections from Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1179, 1195 
(1994).
8. See Fatma Marouf, A Particularly Serious Exception to the Categorical Approach, 97
B.U. L. Rev. 1427, 1469–84 (2017) (arguing that particularly serious crime findings should be 
determined by using the categorical approach that governs crime-based deportability); David
Delgado, Running Afoul of the Non-Refoulement Principle: The [Mis]Interpretation and 
[Mis]Application of the Particularly Serious Crime Exception, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 1,
17–18 (2013) (criticizing the Board’s holdings that non-aggravated felonies can be considered 
PSCs on a case-by-case basis and that there should be no separate determination of dangerousness 
as part of the PSC determination); William M. Hains, Chevron’s Ambiguity Hurdle: Delgado v. 
Holder and the Proper Interpretation of the Particularly Serious Crime Exception to Deportation 
Relief, 2010 BYU L. REV. 81, 99 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Delgado v. Holder 
“perpetuates a misinterpretation of the INA [Immigration and Nationality Act] by declaring that 
the Attorney General is free to designate by adjudication non-aggravated felonies as particularly 
serious, despite the statute’s plain language granting authority only to make such designations by
regulation in this matter); Gwendolyn M. Holinka, Q-T-M-T: The Denial of Humanitarian Relief 
for Aggravated Felons, 13 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 405, 408 (1999) (arguing for alternative 
interpretations of withholding that law would honor both international obligations and domestic 
U.S. interests); Michael McGarry, Note, A Statute in Particularly Serious Need of 
Reinterpretation: The Particularly Serious Crime Exception to Withholding of Removal, 51 B.C.
L. REV. 209, 230–40 (2010) (arguing for separate determination of dangerousness in PSC 
analysis).
9. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150.
10. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267.
11. Deborah E. Anker, Grutter v. Bollinger: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Legitimization 
of the Role of Comparative and International Law in U.S. Jurisprudence, 127 HARV. L. REV. 425, 
426 n.11 (2013).
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interpreting the PSC bar through the lens of violence, beginning with a 
proposed definition of “violent crime” that includes actual or threatened 
physical injury to a person. Part II describes how in the early days of 
interpreting the PSC bar, primarily violent offenses were found to be 
PSCs. Part II then discusses the case of drug trafficking, which laid the 
foundation for nonviolent crimes as PSCs, and discusses today’s 
landscape, where possession of child pornography and financial crimes 
also are PSCs. 
Part III suggests a theory for why nonviolent crimes have become 
PSCs, which I call the “mistrusting criminal judges effect,” and describes 
how the Board and Attorney General eliminated the criminal sentence as 
a relevant factor from its original PSC test. This Part also discusses other 
areas of immigration law in which little to no deference is given to a 
criminal judge’s decision. Finally, Part III links the PSC evolution to the 
severity revolution of criminal law and examines the Bail Reform Act of 
1984,12 which was born out of the severity revolution, as a case study in 
dangerousness from which to draw lessons in the PSC context. In Part 
IV, this Article proposes that the Board or Attorney General, for cases 
falling within their discretion, redefine PSC to include only violent 
offenses against persons where the noncitizen served a significant 
sentence. 
I. THE PSC BAR IN CONTEXT
This Part describes the history of the PSC bar, including its 
international law origins. This Part begins with an overview of asylum 
and withholding of removal, the types of relief available to a refugee in 
U.S. law that are barred due to a PSC conviction.13
                                                                                                                     
12. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50
(2012)).
13. Even if barred from protection under the Refugee Convention due to a crime, a 
noncitizen who fears torture may seek relief under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 
10, 1984, art. 3, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention], which the United States 
ratified in 1994 and adopted into U.S. law through the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring 
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-761, 2681-822 to -823 (1998). Article 3 protects 
a noncitizen from removal to a country “where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture,” regardless of the crimes that subjected her to 
removal. Torture Convention, supra, art. 3; see 8 C.F.R. § 208.17 (2017). In U.S. law, this relief 
remains quite limited, as the Board has chosen to narrowly interpret the meaning of “torture” 
under the Convention. See Torture Convention, supra, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 113–14 (“‘[T]orture’ 
means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
2017] REFUGEE LAW 1099
A. Asylum and Withholding of Removal
A noncitizen who fears persecution in her home country may obtain 
protection under U.S. immigration laws by requesting asylum or 
withholding of removal. These means of requesting protection from the 
U.S. government stem from international protective principles for 
refugees that emerged between the two World Wars and took hold 
following World War II.14 Refugee protections were codified in the 1951 
Refugee Convention15 and 1967 Refugee Protocol,16 to which the United 
States acceded in 1968. By signing the Protocol, the United States 
became bound by Articles 2 through 34 of the Refugee Convention.17 The 
concept of nonrefoulement, or nonreturn, appears in Article 33.1 of the 
Convention, which states that “[no] Contracting State shall expel or 
return . . . a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.”18
Nonrefoulement first was implemented in U.S. law in 1950, and in 
1952 came to be called withholding of deportation.19 In 1996, when 
“removal” replaced “deportation” as the official term describing the 
                                                                                                                     
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful 
sanctions.”); see also Mary Holper, Specific Intent and the Purposeful Narrowing of Victim 
Protection Under the Convention Against Torture, 88 OR. L. REV. 777, 779 (2009) (arguing that 
the Board’s narrow interpretation of “specific intent” impermissibly shifts the focus off protecting 
the victim and onto the alleged torturer’s acts); Lori A. Nessel, “Willful Blindness” to Gender-
Based Violence Abroad: United States’ Implementation of Article Three of the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 71, 80 (2004) (arguing that to provide meaningful 
protection from gender-based torture, the term “acquiescence” must be interpreted to include a 
state’s failure to prosecute or to protect against torture by nonstate actors). While a full discussion 
of the Torture Convention is outside the scope of this Article, it is important to note that it exists 
as one additional protective mechanism beyond asylum and withholding and is available to those 
who are barred from such relief because of a PSC.
14. See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (2d ed. 1996).
15. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 9.
16. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 10.
17. Id. art. I.
18. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 9, art. 33.1.
19. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS 
AND POLICY 793 (8th ed. 2016) (discussing Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 
§ 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010, which exempted noncitizens from deportation “to any country in which 
the Attorney General shall find that such alien would be subjected to physical persecution”); see
also Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243, 66 Stat. 163, 212–14
(enacting 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1952)) (first naming “withholding of deportation,” which 
authorized the Attorney General “to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to 
any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution and for 
such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason”).
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expulsion of a noncitizen from the United States,20 withholding of 
deportation became withholding of removal.21 Withholding is a 
mandatory form of relief from removal.22 If the noncitizen can prove that 
what she fears amounts to persecution,23 that it is more likely than not to 
happen,24 and that it will occur on account of one of the five protected 
grounds, she should be granted withholding, regardless of her desirability 
as a member of the U.S. community. Importantly, though, withholding is 
“country-specific,” which means that an applicant could be deported to a 
third country where she will not face persecution.25 Also, someone who 
has been granted withholding is not given full membership rights in the 
United States, as she may not apply for permanent residency, petition for 
family to join her in the United States, or travel outside the United States.
In effect, she lives under an order of removal, but with permission to stay 
because nonrefoulement prevents her deportation to the country of 
persecution (assuming no other country will accept her).26
Asylum did not exist in U.S. law until 1980, when Congress passed 
the Refugee Act of 1980,27 which amended the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) of 1965.28 Congress maintained withholding of 
deportation, yet introduced asylum, which in some respects is very 
similar to withholding. In order to be granted asylum, an applicant must 
prove fear or persecution on account of one of the five protected 
                                                                                                                     
20. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587 to -597 (enacting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1), 
(3) and (e)(2) (2000)).
21. Congress also moved the nonrefoulement provision to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2000), 
where it had formerly been in 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (1994). IIRIRA §§ 305, 308.
22. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012). In the early days, the nonrefoulement provision was 
discretionary. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987); ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra
note 19, at 813. The United States acceded to the substantive portions of the Refugee Convention, 
in particular Article 33, in 1967, so thereafter nonrefoulement was not discretionary. See Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 423–24. To bring the United States in line with its treaty obligations, the 
United States made withholding mandatory by statute with the Refugee Act in 1980. See id.;
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1253(h)(2)(B) (1982)).
23. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) (defining persecution as a “threat to 
the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who differ in a way 
regarded as offensive”), overruled in part by Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421.
24. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 (1984).
25. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428 n.6 (quoting Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311, 315 
(B.I.A. 1982)).
26. See I-S- & C-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 432, 434 (B.I.A. 2008).
27. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
28. Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.);
see also Refugee Act of 1980, NAT’L ARCHIVES FOUND., https://www.archivesfoundation.org/
documents/refugee-act-1980/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2017).
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grounds.29 The likelihood of persecution need not be as high—the 
Supreme Court has said an asylum applicant must only show a “well-
founded” fear, which translates to a 10% likelihood that persecution will 
occur, whereas a withholding applicant must show a 51% likelihood that 
persecution will occur.30 Should a noncitizen prevail in a request for 
asylum, unlike withholding, she may apply to become a permanent 
resident of the United States and later a U.S. citizen.31 Asylum, however, 
is discretionary; a judge can refuse asylum, even though an applicant has 
met all of the requirements, if the judge believes she is undesirable as a 
member of the U.S. community.32 In such a circumstance, a judge would 
then consider the same applicant’s circumstances for a grant of 
withholding. In contrast to withholding, which implements Article 33.1 
of the Refugee Convention, the Supreme Court has described asylum as 
the U.S. implementation of Article 34 of the Convention,33 which states 
that contracting states “shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation 
and naturalization of refugees.”34
B.  PSC as a Bar to Nonrefoulement
The drafters of the Refugee Convention at first considered the 
principle of nonrefoulement to be so fundamental that there should be no 
exception.35 Including any exception was quite controversial, as it meant 
a signatory country would be allowed to send someone back to the arms 
of her persecutors.36 In fact, the Refugee Convention’s U.S. delegate 
suggested “it would be highly undesirable to suggest in the text of that 
article that there might be cases, even highly exceptional cases, where a 
man might be sent to death or persecution.”37 However, the drafters 
ultimately recognized that national security could trump the 
nonrefoulement principle, and that some countries may not ratify the 
Refugee Convention if there was no exception for dangerous 
individuals.38 The drafters thus opted to include certain bars to protection 
in the form of nonrefoulement: serious nonpolitical crime, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, acts contrary to the purposes and principles of 
                                                                                                                     
29. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b) (2012).
30. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431, 440, 449.
31. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159.
32. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 424.
33. See id. at 441.
34. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 9, art. 34.
35. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 14, at 119–20.
36. See PAUL WEIS, THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951 326–36 (1995).
37. Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees & Stateless Persons, Second Session, ¶ 30, 
U.N. Doc. E/1850; E/AC.32/8 (Aug. 25, 1950).
38. WEIS, supra note 36, at 326–36.
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the United Nations,39 and PSC.40 Although they sound similar, the serious 
nonpolitical crime bars an applicant who has committed some offense 
outside of the country where she is seeking refuge; the PSC bar pertains 
to offenses committed for which there has been a conviction in the 
country of refuge.41
After describing who qualifies for nonrefoulement in Article 33.1 of 
the Refugee Convention, Article 33.2 immediately qualifies that benefit, 
stating: 
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be 
claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for 
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which 
he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of 
a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the 
community of that country.42
The Convention does not define PSC. Leading international refugee 
law experts have commented that it is only justified in the most 
exceptional of circumstances and should include crimes such as murder, 
rape, armed robbery, and arson.43 The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in its Handbook on Procedures 
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status,44 states that the exception 
is reserved for “extreme cases.”45 The UNHCR Handbook goes into more 
detail about how to define a “serious nonpolitical crime”;46 it defines such 
a crime as a “capital crime or a very grave punishable act.”47
C.  U.S. Statutory Implementation of the PSC Bar
The 1980 Refugee Act and each subsequent amendment to the 
withholding statutes contained the PSC bar; it was not until 1996 that 
                                                                                                                     
39. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 9, art. 1(F).
40. Id. art. 33(2).
41. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES ON 
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS, paras. 153–54 (2011), 
http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.html [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK].
42. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 9, art. 33(2).
43. WEIS, supra note 36, at 342; ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, DIV. OF INT’L PROT. OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, COMMENTARY ON THE REFUGEE CONVENTION 1951 art. 33 
cmt. 9 (1997), http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d4ab5fb9.pdf; Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel 
Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion, in REFUGEE 
PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87, 139 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003).
44. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 41, para. 155.
45. Id. para. 154.
46. See id. paras. 155–61. 
47. Id. para. 155 (“Minor offences punishable by moderate sentences are not grounds for 
exclusion under Article 1 F (b) even if technically referred to as ‘crimes’ in the penal law of the 
country concerned.”).
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PSC became a bar to asylum.48 When originally enacted, the PSC bar 
applied to an individual who “having been convicted by a final judgment 
of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of 
the United States.”49 This language replicated the PSC bar in the Refugee
Convention, since “Congress’ primary purposes was to bring U.S.
refugee law into conformance with [the Protocol].”50
In subsequent changes made to the withholding of removal statute, 
Congress began to give some meaning to PSC by reference to another 
term of art in immigration law, “aggravated felony.” In 1990, Congress 
amended the statute to make aggravated felonies categorically PSCs.51
However, in 1990, there were only a small number of crimes that were 
considered aggravated felonies.52 Over the course of several pieces of 
legislation in the 1990s, Congress expanded the definition of what was 
considered an aggravated felony.53 To ensure compliance with the 
Protocol, with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA),54 Congress amended the PSC exception to allow the Attorney 
General to override the categorical determination that all aggravated 
felonies were PSCs when “necessary to ensure compliance with the 1967 
[Refugee Protocol].”55
The AEDPA version of the statute was only on the books for a few 
short months before the current version of the withholding statute was 
passed in 1996 with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).56 The statute reads: “Subparagraph 
                                                                                                                     
48. Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 43, at 107. Although PSC was not a bar to asylum 
until 1996, the Immigration Act of 1990 provided that a noncitizen who has been convicted of an 
aggravated felony “may not apply for or be granted asylum.” Immigration Act of 1990, 
§ 515(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 101-649, Stat. 4978, 5053.
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (1982).
50. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1986). 
51. Immigration Act of 1990 § 515(a)(2). 
52. See infra note 214.
53. See infra note 216.
54. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S. Code).
55. AEDPA § 413(f). The Board, in Q-T-M-T-, established a test to implement AEDPA 
§ 415(f)’s mandate to conduct a discretionary analysis to ensure compliance with the Refugee 
Protocol. 21 I. & N. Dec. 639, 653 (B.I.A. 1996). Aggravated felonies with sentences of at least 
five years would be PSCs, with no further inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the case. 
See id. Aggravated felonies with sentences of fewer than five years, however, would 
presumptively be PSCs, but that presumption could be overcome if “there is any unusual aspect 
of the alien’s particular aggravated felony that convincingly evidences that his or her crime cannot 
rationally be deemed ‘particularly serious’ in light of our treaty obligations under the Protocol.” 
Id. at 654.
56. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 305(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-597 to -598 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). IIRIRA was passed on Sept. 30, 1996, and 
became effective on Apr. 1, 1997.
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(A) [providing for withholding of removal] does not apply . . . if the 
Attorney general decides that the alien, having been convicted by a final 
judgment of a particularly serious crime is a danger to the community of 
the United States.”57 This version of the statute eliminated the categorical 
bar for aggravated felonies.58 In IIRIRA, Congress again expanded the 
definition of aggravated felony, “primarily by reducing, from five years 
to one, the minimum penalty necessary for several offenses to qualify as 
aggravated felonies.”59 Congress then changed the categorical PSC 
exception to only include aggravated felony convictions with at least five-
year sentences.60 In another provision, Congress clarified that such 
sentence did not refer to time served, but included any amount of the 
sentence that was suspended.61 For asylum, Congress deemed all 
aggravated felonies to be PSCs.62
D. Foundational Board Cases Interpreting PSC
Following the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, the meaning of PSC 
was an important unresolved question for the Board to decide. In 1982,
the Board decided Frentescu, which became the seminal case on the 
meaning of PSC.63 In Frentescu, the Board recognized that it was 
charting new territory. The Refugee Act, Protocol, and UNHCR 
Handbook all had little to say about the meaning of the term.64 From the 
statutory language, the Board determined that a “‘particularly serious 
crime’ is more serious than a ‘serious nonpolitical crime,’ although many 
crimes may be classified [as both].”65 The UNHCR Handbook also 
instructed that the PSC bar was for “extreme cases.”66 The Board also 
rejected arguments that PSC is synonymous with “crime involving moral 
turpitude,” another term of art in immigration law with a long history of 
Board case law interpreting its meaning.67
                                                                                                                     
57. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2012).
58. Id.
59. Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 2013).
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); IIRIRA § 305(a).
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B); IIRIRA § 322.
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i); IIRIRA § 604.
63. See Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982), superseded in part by statute,
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, as recognized in C-, 20 I. & N. 
Dec. 529 (B.I.A. 1992).
64. See Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 246.
65. Id. at 245, 247.
66. Id. at 246.
67. Id. at 246 n.7. See generally Mary Holper, Deportation for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude 
Is Void for Vagueness, 90 NEB. L. REV. 647, 649 (2012) (discussing the history of crimes 
involving moral turpitude).
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In order to guide immigration judges in their PSC determinations, the 
Board set forth a test. There are two parts to the Frentescu test: first, the 
judge must determine whether the crime “on [its] face” is a PSC.68 If the 
crime is not inherently particularly serious, the record should be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis.69 For the case-by-case determinations, the Board 
articulated four factors that are relevant to the determination of whether 
a crime is a PSC: “[1] the nature of the conviction, [2] the circumstances 
and underlying facts of the conviction, [3] the type of sentence imposed, 
and, most importantly, [4] whether the type and circumstances of the 
crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the community.”70 The 
Board continuously revived the Frentescu test with each statutory change 
to the PSC bar.71 The test became imbedded in PSC law to such an extent 
that some federal courts of appeals, when reviewing PSC determinations, 
determined that the Board abused its discretion by not applying one of 
the Frentescu factors.72
                                                                                                                     
68. Frentescu, 18 I & N. Dec. at 247. The Board later decided that first degree burglary—
which involves burglary of a residence and aggravating circumstances such as being armed with 
a deadly weapon, displaying a weapon, threatening with a weapon, or causing injury—was a per 
se PSC. See Garcia-Garrocho, 19 I. & N. Dec. 423, 425–26 (B.I.A. 1986), superseded by statute,
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 305(a), 
110 Stat. 3009-546, as recognized in Blandino-Medina v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338 (9th Cir. 2013); 
see also Ahmetovic v. INS, 62 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that first degree manslaughter 
was inherently particularly serious); Gjonaj v. INS, 47 F.3d 824, 826 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
assault with a firearm with intent to murder is so serious that no factual inquiry into individual 
circumstances is necessary); Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357, 360 (B.I.A. 1986) (holding that armed 
robbery involving the use of a firearm on its face is a PSC), modified, Gonzalez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
682 (B.I.A. 1988).
69. Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247.
70. Id. The Ninth Circuit has described the Frentescu decision as “neither adopt[ing] a 
precise definition of what constitutes a particularly serious crime nor set[ting] forth any 
comprehensive list of crimes falling within the definition.” Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1031, 
1039 (9th Cir. 2013).
71. See L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 649 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc); S-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 458, 
463–65 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc), overruled by Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270 (B.I.A. 2002); C-, 20 I. 
& N. Dec. 529, 534, 534 n.3 (B.I.A. 1992). The Board never determined whether the Frentescu 
framework applies to applications decided under AEDPA because the only precedential 
decision, Q-T-M-T-, only addressed the standard for those convicted of aggravated felonies. See
Q-T-M-T-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 639, 654 (B.I.A. 1996).
72. See Afridi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1212, 1221 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We conclude that the 
BIA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing in its duty to consider the facts and circumstances 
of Mr. Afridi’s conviction.”), overruled on other grounds by Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 
F.3d 11471 (9th Cir. 2008); Yousefi v. INS, 260 F.3d 318, 330 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Because the 
Board failed to consider the two most important Frentescu factors and relied on improper 
considerations, we conclude that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.”); cf.
Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming the decision of the agency 
because the Board “properly applied its own precedent” by “address[ing] each Frentescu factor”).
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In 1985, the Board decided another important issue—whether the 
judge should weigh the likelihood of persecution against the seriousness 
of the offense when deciding whether an offense is a PSC. In Rodriguez-
Coto,73 the Board answered this question for both PSCs and serious 
nonpolitical crimes, deciding that the crime determination is a threshold 
issue.74 The Board reasoned: “We cannot find that the language and 
framework of [the withholding provision] supports such an approach, 
which would in effect transform a statutory exclusionary clause into a 
discretionary consideration.”75 Thus a finding that a crime was a PSC 
prevented any further inquiry into the merits of a withholding claim.76
The Supreme Court later upheld this decision with respect to serious 
nonpolitical crimes.77
In the 1986 case Carballe,78 the Board decided whether there should 
be a separate determination of dangerousness once a noncitizen was 
found to have been convicted of a PSC under the Frentescu test.79 The 
“separate determination of dangerousness” at issue in Carballe would be 
akin to a bond hearing, assessing the applicant’s current dangerousness 
and considering evidence such as remorse and rehabilitation.80 The 
finding of dangerousness imbedded within the Frentescu test, on the 
other hand, requires looking at the nature and circumstances of the 
crime—essentially freezing the inquiry at the time of conviction—to 
determine whether that crime and those facts indicate that someone will 
be a danger to the community.81 The Board in Carballe found that the 
statute did not require two separate and distinct factual findings of 
dangerousness.82 The Board stated that “those aliens who have been 
finally convicted of particularly serious crimes are presumptively dangers
                                                                                                                     
73. 19 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 1985), modified, Gonzalez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 682.
74. See id. at 209.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 426 (1999) (“As a matter of plain language, 
it is not obvious that an already-completed crime is somehow rendered less serious by considering 
the further circumstance that the alien may be subject to persecution if returned to his home 
country.”).
78. 19 I. & N. Dec. 357, 360 (B.I.A. 1986), modified, Gonzalez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 682.
79. See id. at 359–60.
80. Id.; cf. Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006) (listing factors an immigration 
judge must consider when determining bond, with one factor being the recency of his criminal 
activity).
81. See Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982) (listing as one of the four factors 
“whether the type and circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the 
community”), superseded in part by statute, Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 
Stat. 4978, as recognized in C-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529 (B.I.A. 1992).
82. Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 360. 
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to this country’s community.”83 The Board found, however, that the two 
clauses were “inextricably related.”84 The Board reasoned that the 
separate dangerousness assessment was not necessary because the 
Frentescu test already incorporated such a finding, since the fourth and 
“most important[]” factor85—danger to the community—is the “essential 
key” to determining whether a conviction is particularly serious.86 Every 
federal court of appeals to consider Carballe has deferred to the decision, 
with several courts opining that Congress intended no separate 
determination of dangerousness once a crime was a PSC.87
II. FROM VIOLENT TO NONVIOLENT CRIMES
There is growing trend in PSC case law where nonviolent offenses are 
PSCs. In the early days, primarily violent offenses were PSCs with one 
exception: drug trafficking. Categorizing drug trafficking as a PSC 
opened the door to recent cases, where more nonviolent offenses such as 
financial crimes and possession of child pornography bar protection. This 
Part will explore this evolution in the PSC case law. To contextualize the 
discussion, this Part begins with a proposed definition of “violent crime.”
A. “Violent Crime” Defined
The law has no settled meaning of “violent crime.”88 Criminal law 
scholar Alice Ristroph has examined a variety of definitions of violent 
crime in common law and federal sentencing laws to demonstrate that 
violence is a dual concept that describes both a seemingly undeniable fact 
of pain and injury to the body and moral judgments.89 The term 
“violence,” she argues, “becomes an abstraction, and eventually that 
abstraction may become a repository for all we find repulsive, 
transgressive, or simply sufficiently annoying.”90 She argues that the lack 
                                                                                                                     
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247.
86. Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 360.
87. See, e.g., Ahmetovic v. INS, 62 F.3d 48, 52–53 (2d Cir. 1995); Al-Salehi v. INS, 47 
F.3d 390, 393 (10th Cir. 1995); Garcia v. INS, 7 F.3d 1320, 1322 (7th Cir. 1993); Mosquera-Perez 
v. INS, 3 F.3d 553, 557 (1st Cir. 1993); Martins v. INS, 972 F.2d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 1992); Arauz 
v. Rivkind, 845 F.2d 271, 275 (11th Cir. 1988), superseded by regulation, 8 C.F.R. 208 (1988);
Ramirez-Ramos v. INS, 814 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1987). Following IIRIRA, a regulation 
was also enacted to codify the Carballe decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (2017) (“For 
purposes of section 241(b)(3)(B)(ii) of the Act, or section 243(h)(2)(B) of the Act as it appeared 
prior to April 1, 1997, an alien who has been convicted of a particularly serious crime shall be 
considered to constitute a danger to the community.”).
88. See Ristroph, supra note 2, at 575.
89. Id. at 574–75.
90. Id. at 575.
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of a critical analysis of violence is one of the failures of criminal law, 
which finds legitimation by addressing the problem of violent crime.91
She writes, “If the criminal law does best when violence—the old-
fashioned, physically harmful kind—is involved, then perhaps the law 
needs a renewed focus on ‘true’ violence.”92
It is this “true” violent crime—that which involves actual or 
threatened physical injury—that this Article proposes as a definition of 
“violent crime” for the purposes of assessing whether an offense is a 
PSC.93 Although federal sentencing law has definitions such as “crime of 
violence”94 and “violent felony,”95 these definitions suffer from the 
broadening of the concept of “violence” that Ristroph describes by 
expanding the term to include crimes involving the risk of injury.96 What 
is more, the Supreme Court recently held that one prong of the “violent 
felony” definition—a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”—is void 
for vagueness.97 Thus, rather than rely on these Congressional definitions 
of violent crime, this Article defines the term by reference to actual or 
threatened physical injury to a person. In this way, this Article uses a 
violent crime definition that more closely tracks the common law “crimes 
against persons” categories, which reflected societal concerns with 
physical injuries to the human body.98
                                                                                                                     
91. Id. at 611–13.
92. Id. at 618.
93. See id. at 573, 618.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012) (defining a “crime of violence” as “an offense that has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property 
of another, or any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk 
that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of 
committing the offense”).
95. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B) (defining “violent felony” as “any crime punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year . . . that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use 
of physical force against the person of another; or is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another”).
96. See Ristroph, supra note 2, at 574.
97. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 
495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990)). The Ninth Circuit, following Johnson, decided that the “crime of 
violence” definition under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), which forms the basis of an “aggravated felony” 
ground of deportation, was void for vagueness. Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 
2015). But see United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340 (2016) (upholding against a vagueness 
challenge a definitional provision located at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)). The Supreme Court 
accepted certiorari on the Dimaya case. See Lynch v. Dimaya, 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016). The case was 
argued in January 2017 and  reargued in October 2017. SCOTUSblog, Sessions v. Dimaya,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/lynch-v-dimaya/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
98. See Ristroph, supra note 2, at 579–80.
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B.  Violent Offenses as PSCs: The Early Days
The Board has never set forth a test whereby only violent crimes could 
be PSCs; however, in its early case law interpreting PSC, primarily 
violent offenses were found to be PSCs. In Frentescu, the Board stated, 
“Crimes against persons are more likely to be categorized as ‘particularly 
serious crimes.’ Nevertheless, we recognize that there may be instances 
where crimes (or a crime) against property will be considered as such 
crimes.”99 Despite leaving the door open to property crimes as PSCs, in 
Mr. Frentescu’s case the Board held that burglary of a dwelling with 
intent to commit theft was not a PSC because “there is no indication that 
the dwelling was occupied or that the applicant was armed; nor is there 
any indication of an aggravating circumstance.”100 In Carballe, the Board 
held that two felony convictions for robbery with a firearm were 
inherently PSCs because they “involved the use of a firearm 
[and] . . . were felonies, as well as offenses against individuals”; thus, 
“On their face, they were dangerous”; the Board went further to describe 
robbery as a “grave, serious, aggravated, infamous, and heinous 
crime.”101
In most subsequent cases, the Board found that violent crimes were 
PSCs.102 For example, robbery by force, violence, or assault was found 
to be a PSC,103 as was robbery of an occupied home while armed with a 
handgun,104 robbery with deadly weapon,105 armed robbery,106
aggravated battery involving a firearm,107 and burglary involving a 
deadly weapon.108 In contrast, the Board held that a conviction for alien 
smuggling (for commercial gain) was not a PSC even though “the act of 
smuggling can put aliens in significant danger, and . . . it can also 
                                                                                                                     
99. Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982), superseded in part by statute,
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, as recognized in C-, 20 I. & N. 
Dec. 529 (B.I.A. 1992).
100. Id.
101. Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357, 360 (B.I.A. 1986).
102. See Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The BIA has consistently 
stated that crimes entailing or threatening to use physical force or violence against another person 
‘are more likely to be categorized as particularly serious.’” (quoting N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
336, 342 (B.I.A. 2007); L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 649 (B.I.A. 1999); L-S-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 973, 
974–75 (B.I.A. 1997))).
103. S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1309 (B.I.A. 2000).
104. S-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 458, 466–67 (B.I.A. 1999), overruled by Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 
270, 270 (B.I.A. 2002).
105. L-S-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 974–75.
106. Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. 208, 208 (B.I.A. 1985).
107. B-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 427, 428–29 (B.I.A. 1991).
108. Garcia-Garrocho, 19 I. & N. Dec. 423, 425–26 (B.I.A. 1986), superseded by statute,
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 305(a), 
110 Stat. 3009-546, as recognized in Blandino-Medina v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338 (9th Cir. 2013).
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endanger the lives of United States residents.”109 In that case, the Board 
stressed that despite the potential for significant bodily harm—the
respondent hid a woman in a compartment built underneath the floor of a 
van—the “respondent did not, in fact, cause [the alien] harm.”110
Although it is possible that the case of alien smuggling seemed more 
closely related to immigration law, and thus fundamentally different than 
conventional criminal law violations it had considered in other PSC 
cases, the Board’s language certainly suggests that the actual causation 
of bodily harm was necessary for an offense to be a PSC in the early days.  
C.  Drug Trafficking as a PSC
Drug trafficking is a nonviolent crime that, in being classified as a 
PSC, became the bridge to other nonviolent crimes becoming PSCs. In 
1988, the Board held that drug trafficking was a PSC, stating, “The 
harmful effect to society from drug offenses has consistently been 
recognized by Congress in the clear distinctions and disparate statutory 
treatment it has drawn between drug offenses and other crimes.”111 In 
1991, the Board found drug trafficking to be a per se PSC, citing to both 
the disparate Congressional treatment of the offense and societal harms 
of drug trafficking.112
                                                                                                                     
109. L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 655 (B.I.A. 1999).  
110. Id. at 654–56.  
111. Gonzalez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 682, 683–84 (B.I.A. 1988). To support this proposition, the 
Board cited immigration statutes that rendered deportable someone who had a conviction relating 
to a controlled substance. See id. at 684 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1), (4) (1982)). The Board 
also discussed the refugee waiver, which asylees and refugees can use to waive grounds of 
inadmissibility for humanitarian reasons; Congress prevented noncitizens who were inadmissible 
for drug trafficking from applying for such waiver. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23) (current 
version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(c)(3), 1159(c) (2012))).
112. U-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 327, 330–32 (B.I.A. 1991). The Board stated: 
Illicit narcotic drugs sold in the United States ruin or destroy the lives of many 
American citizens each year. Apart from the considerable number of people in 
this country who die of overdoses of narcotics or who become the victims of 
homicides related to the unlawful traffic of drugs, many others become disabled 
by addiction to heroin, cocaine, and other drugs. There are also many in this 
country who suffer crimes against their persons and property at the hands of drug 
addicts and criminals who use the proceeds of their crimes to support their drug 
needs. Additionally, a considerable amount of money is drained from the 
economy of the United States annually because of unlawful trafficking in drugs. 
This unfortunate situation has reached epidemic proportions and it tears the very 
fabric of American society.
Id. at 330.
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In 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft in Y-L- created a presumption that 
drug trafficking aggravated felony convictions are PSCs.113 The three 
noncitizens whose cases were considered had been convicted of drug 
trafficking, which met the definition of aggravated felony,114 yet each was 
sentenced to less than five years and thus did not have a statutory PSC 
for the purposes of withholding.115 The Board had held that they were not 
barred from withholding, yet the Attorney General vacated those 
decisions, certifying the case to himself.116 Attorney General Ashcroft 
stated: “[T]he BIA has seen fit to employ a case-by-case approach, 
applying an individualized, and often haphazard, assessment as to the 
‘seriousness’ of an alien defendant’s crime. Not surprisingly, this 
methodology has led to results that are both inconsistent and, as plainly 
evident here, illogical.”117
To support this presumption, he quoted heavily from the 1991 Board 
case about the societal harms of drug trafficking.118 The Attorney General 
further cited to the “long-standing congressional recognition that drug 
trafficking felonies justify the harshest of legal consequences.”119 For this 
assertion, he cited to the controlled substances ground of deportability,120
various harsh penalties for aggravated felons in the INA (of which drug 
trafficking is a subset),121 and other federal statutes outside of 
immigration law.122
                                                                                                                     
113. See Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274 (B.I.A. 2002). 
114. See id. at 271; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (defining “aggravated felony” to 
include drug trafficking).
115. See Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 271, 273.
116. See id. at 272, 277. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h)(1)(i) permits the Attorney General to certify a 
question to him or herself; this practice has been criticized. See Laura S. Trice, Note, Adjudication 
by Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in Attorney General Review of Board of 
Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1766, 1767–68 (2010).
117. Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 273 (citation omitted).
118. Id. at 275. 
119. See id.
120. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (2012)).
121. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (no judicial review for aggravated felons); 8 
U.S.C. § 1228 (expedited removal for aggravated felons)). The Attorney General further stated,
The fact that Congress, as part of the IIRIRA legislation of 1996, chose to jettison 
a prior INA ruling treating all aggravated felonies––of which drug trafficking 
felonies are a subset––as per se ‘particularly serious crimes,’ should not be 
confused with an indication that Congress no longer considered drug trafficking 
crimes in particular, to be as serious and pernicious as it had previously viewed 
them.
Id. at 275–76.
122. See id. at 275 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(12) (providing that a serious federal drug 
offense conviction is an aggravating factor for purposes of imposing the federal death penalty)); 
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What is notable about the Attorney General’s decision is how he 
justified the presumption that drug trafficking is a PSC by reference to 
not only the societal harms caused by drug trafficking, but also the violent 
nature of the offense. He stated:
The devastating effects of drug trafficking offenses on the 
health and general welfare, not to mention national security, 
of this country are well documented. Because the illegal drug 
market in the United States is one of the most profitable in 
the world, it attracts the most ruthless, sophisticated, and 
aggressive traffickers. Substantial violence is present at all 
levels of the distribution chain. Indeed, international 
terrorists increasingly employ drug trafficking as one of their 
primary sources of funding.123
By citing to the violent nature of drug trafficking, he brought this 
holding in line with the many Board cases that had found violent offenses 
to be PSCs.124 He also listed six criteria that a respondent must show to 
overcome the presumption;125 one of these criteria was “the absence of 
any violence or threat of violence, implicit or otherwise, associated with 
the offense.”126 In making the exceptions to his new rule very limited—
only those who could demonstrate all of the criteria he mentioned (not 
just the absence of violence) could escape the PSC presumption—the 
                                                                                                                     
see also id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 862 (subjecting convicted drug traffickers to order of ineligibility 
for federal benefits)).
123. Id. at 276 (footnote omitted); see also Demleitner, supra note 6, at 1064–65 (“In 2002, 
the federal government began a powerful publicity campaign connecting the ‘war on drugs’ with 
the ‘war on terrorism.’”).
124. See supra Section II.B.
125. Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 276–77 (reasoning that there may be the “very rare case where 
an alien may be able to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling circumstances that justify 
treating a particular drug trafficking crime as falling short of [the PSC] standard”).
126. Id. at 276. The six criteria the Attorney General listed to overcome the PSC presumption 
for a drug trafficking crime are “at a minimum:”
(1) a very small quantity of controlled substance; (2) a very modest amount of 
money paid for the drugs in the offending transaction; (3) merely peripheral 
involvement by the alien in the criminal activity, transaction, or conspiracy; (4) 
the absence of any violence or threat of violence, implicit or otherwise, 
associated with the offense; (5) the absence of any organized crime or terrorist 
organization involvement, direct or indirect, in relation to the offending activity; 
and (6) the absence of any adverse or harmful effect of the activity or transaction 
on juveniles.
Id. at 276–77.
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Attorney General likely was marking a new era of nonviolent crimes as 
PSCs.127
D. Possession of Child Pornography as a PSC
The Board’s 2012 decision in R-A-M-128 is a good example of how 
nonviolent crimes have become PSCs in recent years. Mr. R-A-M- feared 
persecution in Honduras because of his sexual orientation and sought 
asylum and withholding of removal.129 While he was in removal 
proceedings, he was convicted of possession of child pornography under 
a California statute that punished knowingly possessing or controlling 
any image or film that depicts a person under the age of eighteen engaging 
in or simulating sexual conduct.130 His sentence was 280 days of 
imprisonment and three years’ probation.131 The immigration judge
found that his offense was an aggravated felony and therefore he had a 
statutory PSC for asylum purposes.132 However, as his sentence was less 
than five years, he was eligible for withholding, so the immigration judge 
was permitted to look at the nature and circumstances of his crime.133
The immigration judge had determined that the crime, although 
serious, was not particularly serious because he had a light sentence; he 
was convicted of possession instead of production, marketing, or 
distribution of child pornography; and the children already had been 
victimized before he downloaded the pornographic materials.134 What is 
most critical is the final portion of the immigration judge’s decision. The 
judge considered that the respondent was receiving treatment for his drug 
and alcohol problem and was scheduled for treatment at an inpatient 
facility upon his release from DHS detention.135 For this reason, the judge 
                                                                                                                     
127. The Ninth Circuit deferred to Y-L-, upholding the Attorney General’s authority under 
the statute to create strong presumptions for PSC determinations. Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 
500 F.3d 941, 948–49 (9th Cir. 2007). The court held, however, that because he pled guilty to 
drug trafficking prior to the Y-L- decision, it could not be applied to his case retroactively. Id. at 
950–53. In unpublished cases, several other courts accepted Y-L- as a proper exercise of the 
Attorney General’s discretion. See, e.g., Infante v. Att’y Gen., 574 F. App’x 142, 145–47 (3d Cir. 
2014); Diaz v. Holder, 501 F. App’x 734, 738 (10th Cir. 2012); Galeneh v. Ashcroft, 153 F. App’x 
881, 886 (3d Cir. 2005).
128. 25 I. & N. Dec. 657 (B.I.A. 2012).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 658.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 658–59 (reasoning that his offense was an aggravated felony pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(I) because it is “described in” 18 U.S.C. § 2252, which punishes the 
knowing possession of child pornography).
133. See id. at 659–60.
134. Id. at 660.
135. Id.
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found, “there was no indication that the respondent had been violent in 
the past or would be violent in the future.”136
The Board reversed, reviewing the judge’s decision de novo137 and 
finding that the conviction was for a particularly serious crime.138 The 
Board first cited to the societal harms of child pornography.139 The Board 
conceded that possession was not as serious as production or distribution 
and thus found that it could look beyond the elements of his offense to 
the facts and circumstances of his crime.140 The only egregious fact the 
Board could point to was that “he [had] repeatedly downloaded numerous 
images and videos of child pornography for his [own] personal use,”141
and thus the Board cycled back to repeating the harmful effects of child 
pornography on society.142 The Board also found unimportant the 
relatively light sentence he received because “the severity of the crime is 
not always reflected in the length of the sentence.”143
In R-A-M-, the Board noted the shift from its past decisions that 
violent crimes against persons tended to be PSCs.144 The Board stated: 
“[W]hile an offense is more likely to be considered particularly serious if 
it is against a person, it does not have to be violent to be a particularly 
serious crime.”145 To support this proposition, the Board cited Y-L-, the 
2002 Attorney General decision that drug trafficking convictions 
presumptively constitute particularly serious crimes,146 and, inexplicably, 
a 2000 Board case holding that a “robbery conviction, which involves a 
violent crime against a person, is a particularly serious crime.”147 The 
Board also cited N-A-M-, a 2007 Board case that appears to have gutted 
the Frentescu test in order to sweep more offenses into the PSC 
category.148
                                                                                                                     
136. Id.
137. Id. at 658.
138. Id. at 660.
139. Id. (“Child pornography is an intrinsically serious offense that is directly related to the 
sexual abuse of children.”).
140. Id. at 661.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 662 (quoting N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 344 n.8 (B.I.A. 2007)).
144. See supra Section II.B.
145. R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 662 (quoting N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 343).
146. Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274 (A.G. 2002), overruled in part by Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 
361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004).
147. S-V-, 22 I. & N Dec. 1306, 1309 (2000).
148. N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342. For those crimes escaping the statutory categorization 
as a PSC, the Board in N-A-M- set forth a test that eliminated the fourth and “most important” 
Frentescu factor, “whether the type and circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be 
a danger to the community.” Id.; Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982). To explain 
such a change, the Board articulated that their approach to determining whether a crime is 
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E. Financial Crimes as PSCs
There has been a series of unpublished cases by the Board finding that 
nonviolent financial crimes were PSCs; federal circuit courts of appeals 
have upheld decisions that mail fraud,149 tax fraud and money 
laundering,150 securities fraud,151 and unauthorized access to a 
computer152 were PSCs. In these cases, federal courts either determined 
they had no jurisdiction to review PSC, a discretionary decision,153 or 
reviewed the decisions under the highly deferential abuse of discretion 
standard of review.154
                                                                                                                     
particularly serious had evolved since Frentescu. “For example,” the Board wrote, “once an alien 
is found to have committed a particularly serious crime, we no longer engage in a separate 
determination to address whether the alien is a danger to the community.” N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. at 342 (citing Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1986)). The Board purported to rely on 
Carballe for this omission, but completely misapplied Carballe’s holding regarding 
dangerousness. In Carballe, the Board held that, once a judge applied the four Frentescu factors 
(of which dangerousness was an essential key), there was no need to engage in a separate
determination of dangerousness, based on future dangerousness. See Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 
360; see also Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Carballe accepted and 
reiterated Frentescu’s reliance on dangerousness as the sine qua non of a particularly serious 
crime . . . .”). What the Board did in N-A-M- was authorize judges to not engage in any 
determination of dangerousness. The impact of this missing fourth factor became clear in 
decisions such as R-A-M-, where the Board managed to skirt any reference to dangerousness when 
it decided possession of child pornography was a PSC, and one of the Board cases deciding that 
a financial crime was a PSC. See R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 662 (“[T]he Immigration Judge’s 
belief that the respondent would not be violent in the future is not dispositive of whether his 
conviction is for a particularly serious crime. As we explained in Matter of N-A-M-, it is not 
necessary to make a separate determination whether the alien is a danger to the community. The 
focus ‘is on the nature of the crime and not the likelihood of future serious misconduct.’” (citation 
omitted) (quoting N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342)); see also Tian v. Holder, 576 F.3d 890, 897
(8th Cir. 2009) (upholding Board’s decision that unauthorized access to a computer is a PSC 
because, due to N-A-M-, “a separate determination of danger to the community [is not]
necessary”).
149. Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 2012). 
150. Hakim v. Holder, 628 F.3d 151, 157 (5th Cir. 2010).
151. Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 273 (3d Cir. 2010).
152. Tian, 576 F.3d at 892, 897.
153. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (no judicial review of discretionary decisions).
But cf. Arbid, 700 F.3d at 383–84 (reasoning, post-Kucana, that PSC determinations can be 
reviewed notwithstanding 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) because the statute does not explicitly vest 
discretion in the Attorney General); Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 247 (2010) (holding that 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) only bars judicial review for decisions that are made discretionary by 
Congress).
154. See, e.g., Arbid, 700 F.3d at 385 (“On abuse-of-discretion review, we may disturb the 
BIA’s ruling if the BIA acted ‘arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law.’” (quoting Singh v. INS, 
213 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2000))).
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In a 2009 case, the Eighth Circuit reviewed a Board decision that 
unauthorized access to a computer was a PSC.155 The Board had 
dismissed an argument that people who commit economic crimes do not 
constitute a danger to the community by describing this claim as 
“speculative” and “unpersuasive.”156 The Eighth Circuit ruled that it had 
no jurisdiction to determine a discretionary decision regarding the proper 
weighing of the Frentescu factors.157 Similarly, in a 2010 Third Circuit 
decision upholding a Board decision that securities fraud was a PSC, the 
court first decided that it did not have jurisdiction over discretionary 
decisions such as PSCs.158 In dicta, however, the court responded to the 
petitioner’s argument that “the BIA ‘has never held that . . . a nonviolent 
white collar criminal offense could constitute a particularly serious 
crime.’”159 The court reasoned that the inclusion of aggravated felonies 
in the PSC bar meant that Congress intended some nonviolent crimes to 
be PSCs (as the aggravated felony definition contains nonviolent offenses 
such as fraud)160 and that “nothing in our precedent suggests that a 
financial crime cannot, as a matter of law, be a particularly serious 
crime.”161 In 2012, the Ninth Circuit upheld a Board decision that mail 
fraud was a PSC.162 The Board in this case upheld an immigration judge’s
decision that, based on the “good likelihood” that the fraud could happen 
again, the petitioner “certainly would be a danger to the community.”163
There, the Ninth Circuit specifically stated that the petitioner had not 
raised a legal challenge to the Board’s interpretation of the withholding 
                                                                                                                     
155. Tian, 576 F.3d at 896–97.
156. Id. at 897. The Board also held that it did not consider a “separate determination to 
address whether the alien is a danger to the community.” N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 
(B.I.A. 2007). But cf. supra note 148 (discussing how the N-A-M- test is flawed).
157. Tian, 576 F.3d at 897.
158. Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 262, 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit 
disagreed with this portion of the ruling in Arbid. See Arbid, 700 F.3d at 384 (relying on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010) that the judicial review bar 
of discretionary decisions contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) only applied to those 
discretionary decisions that the statute makes discretionary).
159. Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 267.
160. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2012) (“The term ‘aggravated felony’ means an offense 
that involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000 . . . .”).
161. Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 268. In a 2010 Fifth Circuit case upholding a Board decision that 
tax fraud and money laundering were PSCs, the court held that the Board need not individually 
consider each Frentescu factor before reaching its decision; it was enough that the Board engaged 
in some case-specific analysis. Hakim v. Holder, 628 F.3d 151, 152, 154–55 (5th Cir. 2010). The 
petitioner did not raise whether the Board had properly weighed the Frentescu factors and 
therefore the court did not need to decide whether it had jurisdiction to review such a discretionary 
decision. Id. at 155 n.1.
162. Arbid, 700 F.3d at 385.
163. Id.
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statute, but only challenged the weighing of the Frentescu factors.164 The 
court, reviewing the Board’s decision on abuse of discretion review, did 
not disturb the Board’s ruling.165
III. EXPLAINING HOW NONVIOLENT CRIMES BECAME PSCS
How did we get to a place where the PSC bar, which was once 
reserved for “extreme” cases166 and typically included only violent 
offenses, has come to include nonviolent offenses like drug trafficking, 
possession of child pornography, and financial crimes? This Part explores 
a theory for why nonviolent crimes are PSCs, the mistrusting criminal 
judges effect, and then seeks to connect this trend to larger trends in both 
immigration law and criminal law.
A. The Mistrusting Criminal Judges Effect
The Board’s increasing lack of faith in criminal judges, which this 
Article terms the “mistrusting criminal judges effect,” provides an 
explanation for why many nonviolent offenses are PSCs. When the Board 
decided Frentescu in 1982, one of the four factors a judge was directed 
to consider was the type of sentence imposed.167 The Board, finding that 
Mr. Frentescu had not been convicted of a PSC, stated that his suspended 
sentence with three months to serve “as viewed by the state . . . court 
judge, reflect[ed] upon the seriousness of the applicant’s danger to the 
community.”168 This statement indicated the Board’s faith in the criminal 
judge’s ability to identify dangerous criminals by imposing on them the 
longest sentences.169
The Attorney General’s 2002 Y-L- decision, where Attorney General
Ashcroft found that drug trafficking convictions were presumptively 
PSCs,170 marked the beginning of the mistrusting criminal judges effect 
in PSC determinations. Attorney General Ashcroft reversed three Board 
decisions finding that drug trafficking convictions with less than a five-
year sentence were not PSCs.171 The Board had based its decision 
partially on the respondents’ cooperation with federal authorities in 
                                                                                                                     
164. Id. at 385 n.4.
165. Id. at 385.
166. See Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 246 (B.I.A. 1982).
167. See id. at 247.
168. Id.
169. See id.; see also L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 655 (B.I.A. 1999) (holding that alien 
smuggling for commercial gain was not a PSC, partially influenced by the sentence imposed, three
and a half months of time served).
170. See Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274 (A.G. 2002), overruled in part by Khouzam v. 
Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004).
171. See id. at 285.
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collateral investigations, their limited criminal history records, and the 
fact that they were sentenced at the low end of the applicable sentencing 
guideline ranges.172 The Board also had read the IIRIRA amendments to 
the PSC bar, which classified only aggravated felonies with five-year 
sentences as per se PSCs, as reflecting a Congressional desire to replace 
classifications based on category or type of crime with classifications 
based on length of sentence imposed.173 The Attorney General disagreed, 
stating that “the discretionary authority reserved to the Attorney General 
with respect to offenses from which less severe sentences flow is clearly 
intended to enable him to emphasize factors other than length of 
sentence.”174 He set forth a presumption that drug trafficking convictions 
were per se PSCs, and only in extraordinary and compelling 
circumstances could a noncitizen overcome the presumption.175 Notably 
absent from this list of criteria that might overcome the PSC presumption 
were several criteria that, for a criminal judge, would justify a lower 
sentence. He wrote: “I emphasize here that such commonplace 
circumstances as cooperation with law enforcement authorities, limited 
criminal histories, downward departures at sentencing, and post-arrest 
(let alone post-conviction) claims of contrition or innocence do not justify 
such a deviation.”176
In 2007, the Board in N-A-M- solidified the mistrusting criminal 
judges effect in the PSC analysis.177 There, the respondent had been 
sentenced to no term of imprisonment for his menacing conviction, yet 
the Board found this fact unimportant.178 The Board wrote: 
Factors that are subsequent and unrelated to the commission 
of the offense, such as cooperation with law enforcement 
authorities, bear only on sentencing. Similarly, offender 
characteristics may operate to reduce a sentence but do not 
diminish the gravity of a crime. Therefore, the sentence 
imposed is not the most accurate or salient factor to consider 
in determining the seriousness of an offense.179
The Board’s rationale begs a question about its faith in the criminal 
judge. Would a criminal judge fail to sentence someone who was a danger 
to the community to prison time, even if there were compelling personal 
circumstances?
                                                                                                                     
172. See id. at 272.
173. Id. at 273.
174. Id. at 274.
175. Id. at 276.
176. Id. at 277.
177. See N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 343 (B.I.A. 2007).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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In 2012, the Board again stated its lack of faith in the criminal judge 
when it decided that possession of child pornography was a PSC in R-A-
M-.180 Notwithstanding the respondent’s sentence of 280 days in prison 
and three years of probation, the Board stated “the nature of the 
respondent’s crime is so condemnable that the length of the sentence is 
less significant to the analysis.”181 This quote highlights the Board’s
substitution of its own judgment for that of the criminal judge: if the 
crime was so condemnable, wouldn’t the criminal judge have given a 
more severe sentence?
The mistrusting criminal judges effect can also be seen in the financial 
crimes cases. Although federal courts upheld unpublished Board cases 
without giving significant discussion of the Board’s underlying rationale, 
we do see that none of the financial crimes upheld as PSCs had sentences 
exceeding the five years this Article proposes as a “significant”
sentence.182 In one case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
upheld a Board decision that discounted a “relatively light” sentence in 
the PSC analysis since her sentence was based on cooperation with law 
enforcement, rather than the nature of her offense.183
Of course, naming the mistrusting judges effect as a cause of the 
problematic PSC expansion suggests that immigration adjudicators 
should follow criminal judges’ decisions. One can argue that criminal 
judges and immigration judges do not share common motives because 
they are actors in different systems with different objectives. The criminal 
law, many say, should focus on rehabilitating the offender so he can be 
released into society.184 In contrast, immigration law should focus on 
whether a particular person should be included in U.S. society in the first 
                                                                                                                     
180. 25 I. & N. Dec. 657, 662 (B.I.A. 2012) (holding that the respondent’s crime, “possession 
of child pornography[,] constitutes a particularly serious crime”).
181. Id. at 662.
182. See, e.g., Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that mail fraud 
with a sixteen-month sentence and $650,000 in restitution was a PSC); Hakim v. Holder, 628 F.3d 
151, 152 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that tax fraud and money laundering with a thirty-seven-month 
sentence was a PSC); Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 262–63 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that 
securities fraud with a fifty-six-month sentence was a PSC); Gao v. Holder, 595 F.3d 549, 552 
(4th Cir. 2010) (holding that tax fraud and unlawful export with a seven-month sentence, eight 
months of community confinement, forfeiture of $505,521, a $2,500 fine, and penalties of $88,885 
was a PSC); Tian v. Holder, 576 F.3d 890, 892–93 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding that unauthorized 
access to a computer with eleven months in prison and a total of $143,000 in restitution was a 
PSC). 
183. Gao, 595 F.3d at 557.
184. SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 116 (9th ed. 2012) (“By 
the early twentieth century, rehabilitation had taken a firm hold in the ideology (if not in the 
practices) of American punishment.”); see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) 
(“Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and 
rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”).
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place.185 However, there is significant debate about the purpose of 
criminal punishment;186 in addition to rehabilitation, criminal law focuses 
on incapacitation for the sake of protecting society.187 The criminal 
judge’s assessment of the nature and circumstances of a person’s crime 
leads the judge to decide how long to incapacitate that offender, thus 
concluding how dangerous of a person he is based on the commission of 
that crime (as well as other factors, such as how likely it is that the 
offender will rehabilitate).188 Because the immigration judge is asked to 
make that same determination when deciding whether the offense is a 
PSC, the sentence given by the criminal judge is particularly relevant.
B.  Mistrusting Criminal Judges in Other Areas of Immigration Law
The mistrusting criminal judges effect is not limited to the Board’s
PSC law, but is apparent in immigration law as a whole. One example is 
the Board’s refusal to recognize vacaturs of guilty pleas by criminal 
courts if those vacaturs are for immigration reasons only.189 Following 
                                                                                                                     
185. See García Hernández, supra note 6, at 1466 (discussing historical distinctions between 
criminal law, which “maintained a focus on the traditional conduct associated with criminality,”
and immigration law, which “remained firmly encamped within civil law, sorting through the 
administrative matter of who was authorized to be in the country”).
186. For a discussion on the different justifications for punishment in criminal law, see
generally KADISH ET AL., supra note 184, at 89–111 (discussing various theories of punishment, 
including utilitarianism, retribution, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and mixed theories).
187. See Williams, 337 U.S. at 248 n.13 (discussing The Trial Judge’s Dilemma, which 
requires a judge, when sentencing an offender, to consider several factors, the first of which is 
“[t]he protection of society against wrong-doers” and the third of which is “[t]he reformation and 
rehabilitation of the [offender]” (citing SHELDON GLUECK, PROBATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 113
(1933))); MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (recommending that a court should 
not sentence a convicted defendant to imprisonment unless “there is undue risk that during the 
period of a suspended sentence or probation the defendant will commit another crime”; “the 
defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his 
commitment to an institution”; or “a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the 
defendant’s crime”); Sheldon Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARV. L. REV.
453, 457 (1928) (“Society’s legal institutions are concerned with the utilitarian possibilities of a 
punishment régime, possibilities which are founded upon the social purpose of the machinery of 
justice, namely, the maintenance of the general security with as little interference with the 
individual’s rights as a human being and citizen as is necessary for the achievement of that social 
purpose.”); see also KADISH ET AL., supra note 184, at 117 (discussing how in the late 1970s, 
rehabilitation as a justification for punishment met with much resistance, but that it has since 
resurged as a central goal of punishment).
188. See García Hernández, supra note 6, at 1497 (“Such ‘indeterminate sentencing’ regimes 
placed enormous responsibility on judges that suggested a deep commitment to the notion that 
judges, as formally neutral actors in the criminal justice system, were well-positioned to assess 
the severity of a convicted individual’s conduct and devise a fitting sanction.”).
189. Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624 (B.I.A. 2003) (“Thus, if a court with jurisdiction 
vacates a conviction based on a defect in the underlying criminal proceedings, the respondent no 
longer has a ‘conviction’ within the meaning of section 101(a)(48)(A). If, however, a court vacates 
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the harsh effects of the 1996 laws, many noncitizens returned to state 
court, seeking to vacate their criminal convictions.190 Since a criminal 
conviction formed the basis of deportation, this would alleviate the 
immigration impact, thus preventing an otherwise legal immigrant from 
being deported.191 At a minimum, the vacatur of the conviction might 
cause the noncitizen to be eligible for relief, thus allowing an immigration 
judge to exercise her discretion in evaluating the equities in a noncitizen’s
case.192 State court judges often were sympathetic, vacating a criminal 
conviction so that the noncitizen could avoid deportation or be eligible 
for relief.193 In 2003, the Board saw what was happening—that 
sympathetic criminal court judges were vacating convictions—and 
decided to blunt the impact of the practice. The Board decided in 
Pickering194 that if a conviction was vacated for immigration purposes 
only, that vacatur would not count for immigration purposes.195 Although 
the Board later retreated from this position, it provides an example of the
Board’s mistrust of state criminal judges.196
Another example of the mistrusting criminal judges effect is the 
Board’s refusal to grant bond to an individual, even though a criminal 
                                                                                                                     
a conviction for reasons unrelated to the merits of the underlying criminal proceedings, the 
respondent remains ‘convicted’ for immigration purposes.”), rev’d, Pickering v. Gonzalez, 465 
F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006).
190. See Miller, Blurring the Boundaries, supra note 6, at 83 (“In the years between 1996 
and 2001, the immigration system bought into the ‘severity revolution’ occurring within the 
criminal justice system.”).
191. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2012) (basing most grounds of crime-related deportability 
on “conviction of a crime”).
192. See id. § 1229b(a). For example, the INA provides for cancellation of removal for lawful 
permanent residents who have not been convicted of an aggravated felony and who have been in 
the United States continuously for seven years after admission in any status, five of which was
after being admitted as a permanent resident. See C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 10–11 (B.I.A. 1998) 
(describing the equitable factors the judge should consider when considering an application for 
cancellation of removal).
193. See Amany Ragab Hacking, Plea at Your Peril: When Is a Vacated Plea Still a Plea for 
Immigration Purposes?, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 459, 459 (2010) (“[A]n Arkansas state court 
vacated the defendant’s conviction solely to avoid immigration consequence . . . .”). 
194. 23 I. & N. Dec. 621 (B.I.A. 2003), rev’d, Pickering v. Gonazlez, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 
2006).
195. Id. at 624. The Sixth Circuit, reviewing the Board’s decision in Pickering, agreed with 
the Board’s ruling as a matter of law, yet decided that in Mr. Pickering’s case, the government 
did not show that the criminal court vacated his conviction solely for immigration purposes. 
Pickering, 465 F.3d at 266–67, 269.
196. The Board later decided that a sentence vacated for immigration reasons only would 
still be valid. Cota-Vargas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 849, 852 (B.I.A. 2005) (“While the language and 
purpose of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act provided support for the interpretive approach we 
adopted in Pickering as it related to the existence of a ‘conviction,’ the Immigration Judge’s
application of the Pickering rationale to sentence modifications has no discernible basis in the 
language of the Act.”).
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court has released that same person on bail or parole.197 The Immigration 
Judge Benchbook, which is written and updated by the Executive Office 
of Immigration Review (the agency that houses the Board and 
immigration judges), provides guidance on immigration substance and 
procedure for judges.198 First introduced in 2007, it is intended to be a 
guide for judges and not a substitute for judges checking the law in their 
circuit courts.199 Nonetheless, it is a significant indicator of how the 
agency perceives the importance of various factors. The Benchbook, 
under the heading “Introductory Guides: Bond,” lists all of the significant 
factors that judges should consider when determining whether to release 
a noncitizen on bond.200 Listed as a “less significant factor” in a bond 
determination is early release from prison, parole, or low bond in related 
criminal proceedings.201
On a legislative level, perhaps the best example of mistrusting 
criminal judges is the elimination of the Judicial Recommendation 
Against Deportation (JRAD) in 1990. When Congress first made 
noncitizens deportable for criminal conduct in 1917, it allowed state court 
sentencing judges to recommend “that such alien shall not be 
deported.”202 Thus, sentencing judges could eliminate the harsh effects of 
the deportation laws by considering, on a case-by-case basis, who was 
                                                                                                                     
197. See Andrade, 19 I. & N. Dec. 488, 490 (B.I.A. 1987) (“Indeed, we find that the 
immigration judge placed undue reliance on the respondent’s parole in reaching her decision. 
Incarcerated individuals may be released from prison early on parole for reasons other than 
rehabilitation. We do not believe this factor in and of itself carries significant weight in 
determining whether an alien is a good bail risk for immigration purposes.”); cf. Shaw, 17 I. & N.
Dec. 177, 179 (B.I.A. 1979) (“[W]e find that the immigration judge placed an undue reliance on 
the pending criminal charges and the lack of a large criminal bond in setting the significant bond 
ordered in this case. We find it inappropriate to speculate as to the possible rationale for the one 
dollar bond set in the criminal proceeding, and we do not agree that the fact that a low criminal 
bond was set somehow weighs in favor of a larger immigration bond.”).
198. The Executive Office for Immigration Review’s Immigration Judge Benchbook, which 
was removed from the agency’s website in mid-2017, is available through the website of an 
immigration law firm that obtained it through a Freedom of Information Act request. Matthew 
Hoppocak, Here is the Current Immigration Judge Bench Book (Sort Of), HOPPOCK LAW FIRM
(July 3, 2017), https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/immigration-judge-bench-book/.
199. Id.
200. Id. The Benchbook lists as significant factors: fixed address in the United States, length 
of residence, family ties in the United States (particularly those that can confer benefits on the 
noncitizen), employment history in the United States, immigration record, attempts to escape from 
authorities, prior failures to appear for scheduled court proceedings, criminal record (including 
extensiveness and recency), and ineligibility for relief from removal. Id.
201. Id. (citing Andrade, 19 I. & N. Dec. 488; Shaw, 17 I. & N. Dec. 177).
202. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 361–64 (2010) (quoting Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 890) (describing history of JRAD, judicial recommendation 
against deportation, which is no longer in existence).
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deserving of a recommendation against deportation.203
“However, . . . Congress first circumscribed the JRAD provision” for 
drug crimes in 1952, and then in 1990 completely eliminated the 
JRAD.204
In another example of Congress mistrusting criminal judges, Congress 
amended the definition of “conviction” in 1996 with IIRIRA. The new 
definition encompasses state court rehabilitative statutes such as deferred 
adjudications that previously would not have led to deportation because 
the criminal judge did not intend them to be convictions.205 Congress thus 
explicitly overruled a 1988 Board decision that allowed adjudications that 
were “deferred” for state purposes to not count as “convictions” in
immigration law.206 Finally, also in 1996, Congress defined a “sentence”
or “term of imprisonment” (which carries significant consequences 
because many convictions are aggravated felonies by virtue of a term of 
                                                                                                                     
203. Id. at 361–62.
204. Id. at 363 & n.5. Professors Margaret Taylor and Ronald F. Wright have given a full 
discussion of the history of JRADs, including the successor and “flip side” to JRADs, the power 
given to sentencing judges to enter orders of a removal, a process that never truly got “off the 
ground.” See Margaret H. Taylor and Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration 
Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1143–57 (2002); see also Legomsky, supra note 6, at 499 (“Federal 
sentencing judges have been given ample power to order removal but, with the abolition of 
JRADs, now have almost no power to prevent it.”).
205. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012) defines “conviction” for immigration purposes as:
a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of 
guilt has been withheld, where—
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of 
guilt, and
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the 
alien’s liberty to be imposed.
206. H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 224 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“This new provision . . . clarifies 
Congressional intent that even in cases where adjudication is ‘deferred,’ the original finding or 
confession of guilt is sufficient to establish a ‘conviction’ for purposes of the immigration laws.”);
see also Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 551–52 (B.I.A. 1988) (interpreting “convicted of” in the 
INA as encompassing the first two prongs of the new definition at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) but 
adding a third: “[A] judgment or adjudication of guilt may be entered if the person violates the 
terms of his probation or fails to comply with the requirements of the court's order, without 
availability of further proceedings regarding the person’s guilt or innocence of the original 
charge”).
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imprisonment of at least one year)207 to mean a suspended sentence.208
Thus, regardless of whether a criminal judge intended to signal that a 
defendant was not dangerous or his crime was not serious and therefore 
he deserved no prison time, that suspended sentence would be seen as no 
different than a sentence where the offender spent the entire time in prison 
as a consequence of his conduct.
There remain areas of immigration law in which Congress has 
maintained some deference to state criminal judges. For example, a 
“crime involving moral turpitude” (CIMT) is a ground of 
inadmissibility,209 yet has a “petty offense exception” if the criminal court 
imposed a sentence of six months or less and the state legislature set the 
maximum possible punishment at one year.210 Many “aggravated felony”
categories are not triggered unless the criminal court imposes a one-year 
sentence.211 Similarly, the statutory PSC bar for withholding is only 
triggered if the court imposes a five-year sentence for an aggravated 
felony.212 The respect given to criminal judges in these provisions was 
blunted, however, by the “term of imprisonment” and “sentence”
definitions Congress set forth with IIRIRA.213 Also, what little deference 
still remains to the criminal court judge is muted by the many offenses 
                                                                                                                     
207. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (stating that the crime of violence is aggravated 
felony if term of imprisonment of at least one year is imposed); id. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (stating that 
a theft offense is aggravated felony if term of imprisonment of at least one year is imposed).
208. Id. § 1101(a)(48)(B) (“Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with 
respect to an offense is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by 
a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment 
or sentence in whole or in part.”); H.R. REP. NO. 104–828, at 224 (“[T]his new definition [of term 
of imprisonment] clarifies that in cases where immigration consequences attach depending upon 
the length of a term of sentence, any court-ordered sentence is considered to be ‘actually imposed,’ 
including where the court has suspended the imposition of the sentence.”).
209. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
210. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II); see also Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law 
and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1731 (2011) (citing to petty offense exception to 
CIMT inadmissibility as a place where “federal immigration law . . . relies on state criminal justice 
actors . . . to exempt certain crimes from the harshness of removal”).
211. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (including the crime of violence with a one-year 
sentence); id. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (including theft or burglary offense with one-year sentence); 
1101(a)(43)(R) (including commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles 
with altered identification numbers with a one-year sentence); id. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (including 
obstruction of justice, perjury, or bribery of a witness with a one-year sentence).
212. See id. § 1231(b)(3).
213. See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text.
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that have been swept into the meaning of terms such as “aggravated 
felony”214 and “crime involving moral turpitude.”215
C.  Mirroring the Severity Revolution in Criminal Law 
The PSC evolution described in Part II reflects not only an 
immigration law trend of mistrusting criminal judges, but also 
demonstrates how certain criminal law trends have manifested 
themselves in immigration law. The severity revolution, so dubbed by 
criminal scholar Joseph Kennedy, was a trend that occurred during the 
1980s and ’90s, where there was a dramatic break in the field of criminal 
punishment.216 In contrast to the prior goals of minimizing pain and 
cruelty in the penal process, the severity revolution espoused severity of 
                                                                                                                     
214. Initially introduced in the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the aggravated felony definition 
included murder, drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking (or attempts or conspiracies to commit 
those crimes). See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 
4469–70. Amendments since 1988 have added crimes of violence, theft, receipt of stolen property, 
fraud, forgery, and obstruction of justice, to name a few of a now twenty-one-part definition. See
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, § 4(b)(5), 117 
Stat. 2875, 2879 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(iii) (2012)) (adding peonage, 
slavery, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons); Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321(a)(1), 110 Stat. 
3009-546, 3009-627 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)) (adding sexual abuse of 
a minor and rape); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
§ 440(e)(8), 110 Stat. 1214, 1278 (adding bribery, forgery, counterfeiting, certain gambling 
offenses, vehicle trafficking, obstruction of justice, perjury, and bribery of a witness); 
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222(a), 
108 Stat. 4305, 4321–22 (adding theft, receipt of stolen property, burglary, trafficking in 
fraudulent documents, RICO, certain prostitution offenses, fraud or deceit, tax evasion, and 
human smuggling); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 § 501(a)(3), 104 Stat. 4978, 
5048 (adding “crime[s] of violence”). With IIRIRA in 1996, Congress also reduced the length of 
sentence necessary to trigger the aggravated felony definition from five years to one year, while 
at the same time defining a sentence to include any suspended sentence. IIRIRA §§ 321(a), 322(a)
(amending aggravated felony and “term of imprisonment” definition).
215. In a prior article, I described how “[t]he term CIMT allows immigration judges to make 
judgments about the ‘moral standards prevailing at the time,’ thus placing them in the role of God, 
passing judgment on the morals of the noncitizens whose cases lie in their hands.” Holper, supra
note 67, at 678–79 (footnote omitted). I describe several circumstances where the Board has swept 
more crimes into the CIMT category. See id. at 682–83. For example, failure to register as a sex 
offender, aggravated DUI, and domestic violence are each crimes that, once brought to the 
attention of the Board, fit within the broad CIMT category. See, e.g., Tobar-Lobo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
143, 144–46 (B.I.A. 2007); Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188, 1196 (B.I.A. 1999); Tran, 21 I. & 
N. Dec. 291, 293–94 (B.I.A. 1996). In these examples, the Board looked to contemporary “moral 
standards” to define what type of crime involves moral turpitude. See, e.g., Tran, 21 I. & N. Dec. 
at 294. More recently, the Board has swept additional offenses into the crime involving moral 
turpitude category, finding that more theft offenses involved moral turpitude. See, e.g., Obeya, 26 
I. & N. Dec. 856, 861 (B.I.A. 2016); Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I. & N. Dec. 847, 854–55 (B.I.A. 2016). 
216. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 831–32.
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punishment as an overarching good.217 The severity revolution was both 
expressive (communicating the message about the seriousness of certain 
types of offenses) and instrumental (focusing on public protection and 
risk management).218 As part of the severity revolution, legislatures 
responded to courts’ willingness to “let off” too many offenders by 
enacting harsh mandatory minimum sentences,219 thus decreasing courts’
discretion to consider the whole person and his circumstances. Discretion 
was shifted into the hands of prosecutors, who could choose among 
criminal charges and have significant negotiating power due to the harsh 
mandatory minimum sentences, and police, who could choose which 
people to arrest in the first place.220
                                                                                                                     
217. Bernard E. Harcourt, The Shaping of Chance: Actuarial Models and Criminal Profiling 
at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 105, 105 (2003) (“At the close of the 
century, the contrast could hardly have been greater. The rehabilitative project had been largely 
displaced by a model of criminal law enforcement that emphasized mandatory sentences, fixed 
guidelines, and sentencing enhancements for designated classes of crimes. The focus of criminal 
sentencing had become the category of crime, rather than the individual characteristics and history 
of the convicted person, with one major exception for prior criminal conduct.”); see Kennedy, 
supra note 4, at 831; Simon, supra note 4, at 219.
218. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 856; cf. Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New 
Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY
449–50, 452 (1992) (discussing what the authors term the “new penology,” which focuses on risk-
based assessments and managing dangerous populations without regard to individual 
circumstances of each offender).
219. See García Hernández, supra note 6, at 1498–99 (“Rather than continue to confide in 
the neutral role that judges are supposed to occupy, over the next two decades [after the 1970s] 
policymakers began to portray judges as ‘betrayers of the common good.’” (quoting JONATHAN 
SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 113 (2007))); see also WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE 
COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 227–28 (2011) (describing the Warren court’s errors, 
including “siphoning the time of attorneys and judges away from the question of the defendant’s 
guilt or innocence and toward the process by which the defendant was arrested, tried, and 
convicted,” which produced a political and legal backlash); García Hernández, supra note 6, at 
1499 (discussing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which established the Sentencing 
Commission, which in turn issued sentencing guidelines to bind federal judges, and the financial 
incentives Congress provided to states to enact “‘truth in sentencing’ laws that required convicted 
individuals to serve at least eighty-five percent of their sentence[s]”); Kennedy, supra note 4, at 
850–52 (discussing the turn toward more determinate sentencing processes, which was supported 
by liberals, who were concerned about invidious discrimination in the criminal justice system, 
and conservatives, who supported strict accountability in punishment); Simon, supra note 4, at 
236 (discussing “3-Strikes” laws that swept through the country in the mid-1990s, which 
“simultaneously expressed mistrust of judges and contempt for the intellectual capacities of repeat 
offenders”).
220. See García Hernández, supra note 6, at 1497, 1499–1500.
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Immigration law scholar Theresa Miller has noted the appearance of 
these criminal law trends in immigration law, commenting, “In the years 
between 1996 and 2001, the immigration system bought into the ‘severity 
revolution’ occurring within the criminal justice system.” 221 In her first 
article on this topic,222 she describes harsh features of the immigration 
system, such as the curtailment of procedural and substantive rights,
increased immigration enforcement instead of a preference for 
assimilation, expanded criminal grounds of deportation while curtailing 
relief and expanded criminal grounds of detention (all of which rely on 
group-based as opposed to individual assessments of dangerousness),
increased cooperation between local law enforcement and immigration 
authorities, and the conversion of immigration from a civil rights issue to 
a national security issue.223 These features, she argues, have transformed 
the immigration system in a similar way that the criminal justice system
was transformed starting in the 1980s, with a shift in focus from 
rehabilitating the individual offender to managing dangerous populations 
through blanket policies (thus presuming their inability to rehabilitate).224
In Miller’s second article on this topic,225 she builds on her earlier work 
by discussing how the war on terror following the attacks of 9/11 
capitalized on immigration law’s utility for “crime control and social 
control to confront the ‘hypercrime’ of terrorism.”226 She cites to post-
9/11 policies, including the surveillance, classification, and containment 
of supposedly high-risk populations, namely Muslim or Middle Eastern 
men, instead of focusing on individual dangerousness.227
Miller did not address the severity revolution’s reflection in PSC law,
which at the time she wrote may have seemed like a narrow corner of 
refugee law. However, as outlined in Part II, the PSC category is growing, 
and, like other crimmigration terms of art, sweeping in many offenses.228
In PSC cases, one can see the impact of the severity revolution, with the 
Board and Attorney General deciding that criminal judges’ decisions 
about who merited punishment and incarceration were not the best 
indicators of who actually was a danger to the community.229
                                                                                                                     
221. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries, supra note 6, at 83.
222. See generally Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 6 (discussing the downside of 
moving towards a “severity revolution” in the context of immigration law).
223. See id. at 615.
224. See id. at 611, 653–54.
225. See generally Miller, Blurring the Boundaries, supra note 6 (discussing the social 
control dimensions as they related to the escalating criminalization of immigration law).
226. Id. at 85.
227. Id. at 102–04.
228. See supra Part II; see also notes 214–15 (describing expansion of “aggravated felony” 
and “crime involving moral turpitude”).
229. See supra Section III.A.
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The severity revolution’s targeting of certain types of offenders is also
mirrored in the published PSC cases. As Joseph Kennedy wrote, drug 
dealers, child molesters, and violent criminals became scapegoats for a 
society that lacked a common religion in the 1980s and ’90s.230 He wrote, 
“[h]orrible crimes provide moments of communion for a secular society 
that no longer comes together within the walls of any one church or 
around any one text.”231 A diverse secular society could rely on 
punishment of these “monstrous offenders” to express a shared sense of 
the sacred, whereas more homogeneous societies could rely on uniform 
religious beliefs.232 The published PSC cases reflect this same 
scapegoating of such “monstrous offenders”: drug trafficking, violent 
offenses, and possession of child pornography all are PSCs, thus 
reflecting the perceived danger that these types of offenders present to 
U.S. society.233
The determinate sentencing schemes of the severity revolution also 
reflect a “harm-based system of penology,”234 which “leave[s] less room 
for an individualized assessment of an offender’s circumstances.”235
Similarly, the PSC analysis, like the severity revolution, focuses not on 
the individual offender but on the risks presented by certain classes of 
offenders and the harms those crimes cause.236 Rather than focus on the 
dangerousness or individual characteristics of one offender, drug 
trafficking became a per se PSC based on the generalized harm it caused 
to society.237 Instead of focusing on any particular harms caused by one 
person who possessed child pornography, the Board instead focused on 
the societal harms that such possession causes.238 Board decisions finding 
financial crimes to be PSCs also have made generalizations about the 
societal harms of such crimes.239
                                                                                                                     
230. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 833.
231. Id. at 847.
232. Id. at 848, 858.
233. See supra Part II.
234. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 856 (quoting Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing 
Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 908–09 (1991)); accord Feeley 
& Simon, supra note 218, at 461.
235. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 856.
236. See Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 6, at 646. Theresa Miller noted such 
categorization and risk management in immigration law by a movement away from individualized 
determinations and toward group-based assessments of dangerousness. Id. at 651. She cites 
examples such as mandatory detention and the broadening of the meaning of “aggravated felons,” 
which authorizes both mandatory detention and deportation. Id.
237. See Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274–75 (A.G. 2002), overruled in part by Khouzam v. 
Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004).
238. See R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 657, 660–61 (B.I.A. 2012).
239. In one of the author’s cases, a client with an identity theft conviction was found to have 
been convicted of a PSC; the Board supported its holding by stating, “Identity theft is a serious 
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Unfortunately, because the Refugee Act was passed in 1980, at the 
dawn of the severity revolution, its humanitarian aspects could not 
override the “tough on crime” mentality of the severity revolution.240 In 
fact, as criminal law scholar Jonathan Simon has observed, the new 
refugees of the 1980s, who were neither politically nor ethnically similar 
to the majority of Americans, were viewed not sympathetically but as a 
threat to national security.241 Thus we see, in the interpretation of the 
Refugee Act through the PSC bar, the severity revolution playing out in 
individual decisions about which people are eligible for withholding. As 
part of this trend, we see the Board and Attorney General losing all faith 
in criminal judges to help determine, for purposes of PSC determinations, 
who is a danger to the community. We also see the Board and Attorney 
General making broad generalizations about classes of offenders as a way 
to minimize the risk presented by certain societal scapegoats.
D. The Bail Reform Act of 1984: A Case Study in Dangerousness
If the PSC evolution has in fact mirrored the severity revolution, it is 
helpful to compare PSC law to a severity revolution-era law with a similar 
purpose. The Bail Reform Act (BRA) of 1984, part of the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act of 1984,242 provides a useful case study in a law that 
                                                                                                                     
problem in our society.” L-V-R- (Nov. 17, 2014). This case was remanded to the Board to 
determine how a 1996 statutory provision would apply to her PSC analysis. See Velerio-Ramirez 
v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 111, 118 (1st Cir. 2015). The Board subsequently upheld its prior decision, 
focusing on the societal ills of identity theft. L-V-R- (Sep. 23, 2016).
240. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 855.
241. See Jonathan Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age: The Rebirth of Immigration Prisons 
in the United States, 10 PUB. CULTURE 577, 582–84 (1998). Simon discusses how the Cold War 
pattern of refugees fleeing to the United States from Communist countries ended in the 1980s, as 
more Central Americans and Haitians sought protection. Id. at 582. He also describes how the 
Mariel Boatlift, which caused thousands of Cuban refugees to descend upon Miami at one time 
in 1980, changed the public’s perception of a refugee, as they were both darker-skinned than prior 
Cuban immigrants and erroneously deemed to be predominantly criminals and mentally ill. See 
id. at 590. Likewise, Haitian refugees were “overwhelmingly black and most were poor,” and “an 
early association of Haiti as having a high incidence of AIDS cases further stigmatized the entire 
population.” Id. at 591; cf. García Hernández, supra note 6, at 1461 (“By the mid-1980s, 
immigration reentered the political arena where prominent policymakers associates the new round 
of arriving noncitizens, racialized as not white, with lawbreaking that endangered the nation’s 
security.”). Others have suggested that the arrival of large numbers of asylum-seekers causes 
countries to curtail the right to refuge out of concern for controlling borders. See, e.g., David A. 
Martin, The Refugee Concept: On Definitions, Politics, and the Careful Use of a Scarce Resource,
in REFUGEE POLICY: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 30 (H. Adelman ed., 1991) (“When the 
number of asylum-seekers increases sharply, the ability to control appears increasingly threatened, 
at least in the absence of a convincing demonstration that the increase came from a real outbreak 
of implacable persecution––that is, evidence that most of the new arrivals are ‘true refugees.’”).
242. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 21, 
28, 29, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
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was passed at the height of the severity revolution and discusses the 
meaning of danger to the community. The 1984 BRA was enacted to 
respond to society’s growing concern for the possibility of crimes being 
committed by defendants awaiting trial for both capital and noncapital 
offenses.243 Maintaining a presumption for pretrial release, the 1984 BRA 
mandated that the government prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that no-release conditions will reasonably ensure the safety of the 
community.244 Congress included the consideration of dangerousness, 
however, as a strict exception to the presumption of pretrial release.245
The 1984 BRA created a procedure whereby prosecutors can ask for 
detention hearings when the case involved certain crimes, such as drug 
trafficking and crimes of violence, that indicated a defendant’s
dangerousness.246 The 1984 BRA also created rebuttable presumptions of 
dangerousness when defendants are charged with certain enumerated 
crimes,247 effectively shifting the burden of production from the 
government to the defendant.248 The judicial officer presumes, in these 
cases, that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably 
assure the appearance of the defendant at trial or the safety of the 
community if there is probable cause to believe that the defendant 
committed certain enumerated offenses.249 The rebuttable presumptions 
have been amended over the years to include several offenses; today, 
offenses involving drug trafficking, terrorism, carrying a firearm in the 
commission of a crime of violence, and offenses involving minor victims 
                                                                                                                     
243. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50; S. REP. NO. 225, at 5 (1983) (“[The 1966 Bail Reform Act]
has come under criticism as too liberally allowing release and as providing too little flexibility to 
judges in making appropriate release decisions regarding defendants who pose serious risks of 
flight or danger to the community. . . . In the Committee’s view, it is intolerable that the law denies 
judges the tools to make honest and appropriate decisions regarding the release of such 
[dangerous] defendants.”). 
244. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142. To determine whether or not a particular defendant is dangerous 
to the community, a judicial officer shall consider: (1) the circumstances of the charged offense; 
(2) the amount of evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and character of the defendant; 
and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to another person or the community. Id. § 3142(g).
245. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the BRA of 1984 in 1987. United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747–49, 751 (1987). 
246. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); S. REP. NO. 225, at 17–22.
247. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3).
248. See, e.g., United States v. Carbone, 793 F.2d 559, 560 (3d Cir. 1986) (“In effect, these 
sections create a rebuttable presumption against [the defendant’s] release and imposed the burden 
of producing countervailing evidence upon him.”); United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 380–
81 (1st Cir. 1985) (in construing Bail Reform Act of 1984, determining that “Congress did not 
intend to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant but intended to impose only a burden of 
production”); United States v. Diaz, 777 F.2d 1236, 1237–38 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 251 (5th Cir. 1985).
249. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3).
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(from sexual abuse to offenses involving child pornography) all create 
the rebuttable presumption of dangerousness.250
What lessons can one draw from the 1984 BRA to import into PSC 
law? First, the evolution of which categories of crimes evince 
“dangerousness” in the BRA parallels this evolution in PSC 
determinations. The BRA’s signature component, the authorization of 
pretrial detention due to dangerousness,251 was modeled after the District 
of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedures Act of 1970.252 In 
the D.C. statute, Congress only permitted pretrial detention if the 
prosecutor proves by a substantial probability that the defendant 
committed a crime of violence253 or a “dangerous crime.”254 “Dangerous 
crime” was defined by reference to violent crimes: theft by force, 
burglary of a dwelling, arson, rape, or assault with intent to commit 
                                                                                                                     
250. See id. The statute creates a presumption of dangerousness if there is probable cause to 
believe that the defendant committed: (1) an offense for which the maximum term of 
imprisonment of ten years or more is mandated by the Controlled Substances Act, the Controlled 
Substances Import and Export Act; (2) an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (person who during 
and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm), 
§ 956(a) (person who conspires to murder, kidnap, or maim), or § 2332b (person who commits 
acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries) of this title; (3) an offense listed in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2332b(g)(5)(B) (person who commits federal crime of terrorism) for which a maximum term of 
ten years is prescribed; (4) an offense under chapter 77 for which a maximum term of 
imprisonment of twenty years or more is prescribed (peonage, slavery, and human trafficking); or 
(5) an offense involving a minor victim (like kidnapping, sex trafficking, sexual abuse, offenses 
resulting in death, sexual exploitation, selling or buying of children, child pornography, or 
transportation of minors). Id.
251. See S. REP. NO. 225, at 18 (discussing how 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(e) and (f) “create[] new 
authority to deny release to those defendants who are likely to engage in conduct endangering the 
safety of the community even if released pending trial only under the most stringent of the 
conditions listed in section 3142(c)”).
252. See id. at 22. Scholars disputed how closely the BRA tracked the DC statute because 
the BRA had fewer procedural protections. Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial 
Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 347 (1990).
253. Section 1331(4) defined “crime of violence” as:
murder, forcible rape, carnal knowledge of a female under the age of sixteen, 
taking or attempting to take immoral, improper, or indecent liberties with a child 
under the age of sixteen years, mayhem, kidnaping, robbery, burglary, voluntary 
manslaughter, extortion or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, arson, 
assault with intent to commit any offense, assault with a dangerous weapon, or 
an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses as defined by 
any Act of Congress or any State law, if the offense is punishable by 
imprisonment for more than one year. 
D.C. Code § 23-1331(4) (1970).
254. Id. § 23-1322(a)(1).
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rape.255 “Dangerous crime,” however, also included drug trafficking.256
Similarly, in the 1984 BRA, Congress deemed drug traffickers a danger 
to the community by describing dangerousness by the term “safety of any 
other person or the community.”257 The Senate Report stated, 
The committee intends that the concern about safety be 
given a broader construction than merely danger of harm 
involving physical violence. . . . The committee also 
emphasizes that the risk that a defendant will continue to 
engage in drug trafficking constitutes a danger to the “safety 
of any other person or the community.”258
The DC model tracks the early days in which crimes were labeled 
PSCs; in those days, only violent crimes and drug trafficking convictions 
were PSCs. The 1984 BRA kept drug trafficking as a proxy for 
dangerousness; the drafters intended to track the DC statute’s
dangerousness definitions.259 In 2003, however, Congress expanded the 
presumption of dangerousness in federal bail determinations to include 
other nonviolent offenses such as possession of child pornography.260
Similarly, the Attorney General in 2002 decided that drug trafficking was 
presumptively a PSC, building on earlier Board decisions,261 and the
                                                                                                                     
255. A “dangerous crime” included:
(A) taking or attempting to take property from another by force or threat of force, 
(B) unlawfully entering or attempting to enter any premises adapted for overnight 
accommodation of persons or for carrying on business with the intent to commit 
an offense therein, (C) arson or attempted arson of any premises adaptable for 
overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business, (D) forcible 
rape, or assault with intent to commit forcible rape, or (E) unlawful sale or 
distribution of a narcotic or depressant or stimulant drug (as defined by any Act 
of Congress) if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than one 
year. 
Id. § 23-1331(3).
256. Id. § 23-1331(3)(E).
257. S. REP. NO. 225, at 12–13.
258. Id.; see also Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of 
1984: The Loss of the Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 36 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 121, 143 (2009) (“[T]he BRA does not define danger; the legislative history does 
suggest, however, that Congress considers drug trafficking dangerous to communities.”).
259. See S. REP. NO. 225, at 20–21.
260. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 203, 117 Stat. 650, 660 (amending 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142(e) to include several offenses involving minor victims, including kidnapping, production 
or possession of child pornography, and transporting children for the purposes of child 
prostitution).
261. See supra Section II.C.
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Board in 2012 decided that possession of child pornography was a 
PSC.262
Second, that financial crimes and most other nonviolent offenses do 
not create a presumption of dangerousness under the BRA or authorize 
pretrial detention based on dangerousness should be significantly 
instructive in the PSC context.263 As noted, the Board and Attorney 
General may be subtly tracking the BRA’s dangerousness presumptions 
in its published decisions. The only nonviolent offenses found to be PSCs 
in published decisions concerned drug trafficking and possession of child 
pornography, offenses which would create a presumption of 
dangerousness under the BRA (although neither the Board nor Attorney 
General referenced the BRA in those decisions).264 However, financial 
crimes create no presumption of dangerousness under the BRA.265
                                                                                                                     
262. See R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 657, 660 (B.I.A. 2012).
263. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)–(f). Several circuit courts have held that pretrial detention for 
dangerousness is only authorized when the case involves one of the enumerated crimes set forth 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) or (f) or if, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B), there is a serious risk 
that the defendant will obstruct justice or threaten, injure, or intimidate a prospective witness or 
juror. See, e.g., United States v. Bryd, 969 F.2d 106, 109–10 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Detention can be 
ordered, therefore, only ‘in a case that involves’ one of the six circumstances listed in (f), and in 
which the judicial officer finds, after a hearing, that no condition or combination of conditions 
will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person 
and the community.”); United States v. Ploof, 851 F.2d 7, 11–12 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that 
pretrial detention solely on the ground of dangerousness to another person or to the community is
not authorized); United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 157–58 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The district court 
ordered that the defendant be detained prior to trial because of the danger of the defendant’s 
recidivism in crimes involving the use of fraudulent identification. We hold that this is not the 
type of danger to the community which will support an order of detention under the Bail Reform 
Act of 1984.”).
264. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E) (presumption of dangerousness in pretrial 
detention hearing if there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed one of a number 
of offenses against minor victims, one of which is 18 U.S.C. § 2252, which punishes, in part,
receipt of child pornography in interstate commerce), and id. § 3142(e)(3)(A) (presumption of 
dangerousness in pretrial detention hearing if there is probable cause to believe the defendant 
committed a drug trafficking offenses), with R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. at 660 (holding that possession 
of child pornography is a PSC), and Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274 (A.G. 2002) (holding that 
drug trafficking convictions are presumptively PSCs).
265. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). For the purposes of a bail hearing pending sentencing pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3143, which does not limit the categories of crimes that create a presumption of 
dangerousness, courts have found that the likelihood to commit financial crimes can demonstrate 
danger to the community. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 956 F.2d 192, 192–93 (9th Cir. 
1992) (“We further hold that danger may, at least in some cases, encompass pecuniary or 
economic harm.”); see also United States v. Madoff, 316 F. App’x 58, 59–60 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(reasoning, in dicta, that defendant convicted of nonviolent offenses can still be a danger to the 
community for purposes of bail determination on appeal). In United States v. Provenzano, the 
Third Circuit interpreted a prior version of BRA, which authorized detention based on
dangerousness when considering bail for a defendant on appeal but, unlike the 1984 BRA, set 
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Therefore, if the Board or Attorney General were to use the BRA’s
dangerousness presumptions as an analogy for which classes of offenders 
are a danger to the community, financial crimes do not fit.
IV. PROPOSAL: VIOLENT CRIMES WITH SIGNIFICANT PRISON TIME AS 
PARTICULARLY SERIOUS CRIMES
This Article proposes that the Board or Attorney General, for 
discretionary PSCs, redefine PSC to include only violent offenses against 
persons where the noncitizen served a significant sentence. Although the 
PSC statutory definition certainly could benefit from an overhaul, since 
in its current form all aggravated felonies (a category that includes 
numerous nonviolent offenses) with five-year sentences (which do not 
require time to be served) are automatically PSCs for the purposes of 
withholding of removal,266 a Congressional amendment to the PSC 
definition is outside of the scope of this Article.
This proposal allows PSC law to benefit from the lessons learned from 
the severity revolution. There has been significant scholarly critique of 
the draconian crime-prevention measures passed during the 1980s and 
’90s267 and the BRA in particular.268 The references to drug trafficking as 
                                                                                                                     
forth no statutory presumptions of dangerousness. 605 F.2d 85, 95 (3d Cir. 1979). Although the 
defendants had been convicted of federal racketeering, which involved no physical harm to any 
person, the court held that “a defendant’s propensity to commit crime generally, even if the 
resulting harm would be not solely physical, may constitute a sufficient risk of danger to come 
within the contemplation of the Act.” Id. The drafters of the 1984 BRA cited to Provenzano to 
justify the idea that “danger to the community” can be extended to nonphysical harms. S. REP.
NO. 225, at 12 (1983).
266. See supra notes 51–62 and accompanying text; supra note 214.
267. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 3, 8–20 (2001) (describing 
twelve indices of change in the U.S. and British criminal justice systems from 1970 to 2000 and 
stating, “The last three decades have seen an accelerating movement away from the assumptions 
that shaped crime control and criminal justice for most of the twentieth century”); JONATHAN 
SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 3–4 (2007) (“Americans have built a new civil 
and political order structured around the problem of violent crime. . . . [M]any Americans have 
come to tolerate [organized barbarism] as a necessary response to unacceptable risks of violence 
in everyday life.”); STUNTZ, supra note 219, at 5 (“The criminal justice system has run off the 
rails. . . . [N]o stable regulating mechanism governs the frequency or harshness of criminal 
punishment, which has swung wildly from excessive lenity to even more excessive severity.”); 
Kennedy, supra note 4, at 833 (“We have developed a draconian system of punishment for dealing 
with the monsters that we have imagined being everywhere, a system that swallows up hordes of 
lesser offenders.”); Simon, supra note 4, at 221 (considering different theories behind the 
“severity revolution”).
268. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J.
723, 749–51 (2011) (arguing that the BRA violates the due process concept of the presumption 
of innocence); Wiseman, supra note 258, at 155–56 (arguing that the BRA’s allowance for judges 
to consider ‘“character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial 
2017] REFUGEE LAW 1135
a proxy for dangerousness, thus meriting long prison sentences, is part of 
the severity revolution, the context in which the “war on drugs” took 
place.269 Political leaders sought to link drug crimes to violence in order 
to win support for the war on drugs.270 The severity revolution, however, 
has failed.271 Many believe that we lost the war on drugs.272 Thus it is 
untenable to cling to such proxies for dangerousness, especially when 
refugee protection is at issue. For this reason, this Article does not argue 
that PSC decisions should perfectly track the BRA dangerousness 
presumption categories. Rather, the meaning of “dangerousness” in PSC 
determinations should be interpreted more narrowly than the those in 
federal bail law, since a person’s life is at stake, and a PSC finding means 
that a noncitizen may not even present the facts of persecution to an 
immigration judge.273 When interpreting the Refugee Convention, the 
trend should be heading in the opposite direction from the criminal justice 
                                                                                                                     
resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, [and] history 
relating to drug or alcohol abuse,”’ along with their ‘“history and characteristics”’ when deciding 
whether to grant a bail violates the anti-discrimination principles of the Eighth Amendment
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g))); see also Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventative 
Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 376–78 (1970) (critiquing preventive 
detention and the precursor to the BRA of 1984, the District of Columbia Court Reform and 
Criminal Procedures Act of 1970, as the first time a bail judge could consider dangerousness 
because historically, bail law had only allowed judges to consider flight risk). But see Albert 
Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to 
Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 548–50 (1986) (disputing the historical record that pretrial 
detention was only based on flight risk and never on dangerousness). 
269. See Simon, supra note 4, at 227.
270. See Ristroph, supra note 2, at 614–15.
271. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 4, at 907 (“We are imprisoning legions of people who 
do not deserve or need to be imprisoned and keeping others incarcerated for far longer than we 
should.”); see also STUNTZ, supra note 219, at 294–97 (discussing changes that must be made in 
the law and practice of criminal sentencing, starting with its severity, because “America’s inmate 
population is infamously massive”).
272. See, e.g., Nekima Levy-Pounds, Going up in Smoke: The Impacts of the Drug War on 
Young Black Men, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 563, 564 (2013) (describing the “devastating impacts” 
and “unintended consequences” that have resulted from the war on drugs); Edward McGlynn 
Gaffney, Jr., On Ending the War on Drugs, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. xi, xvii (1997); David Schultz, 
Rethinking Drug Criminalization Policies, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 151, 156–57 (1993) (“[T]here 
is no solid evidence that drug interdiction and enforcement strategies decreased production of 
drugs or decreased either the supply or demand for drugs in the United States.”); see also
Kenworthey Bilz & John M. Darley, What’s Wrong with Harmless Theories of Punishment, 79 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1215, 1244–45 (2004) (discussing harms to black communities stemming from 
the longer sentences for crack cocaine than for powder cocaine); Ristroph, supra note 2, at 615 
(discussing how the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s “Drugs Violence Task Force,” created in the 
1990s, demonstrated weak empirical support of a link between drugs and violence and that “some 
evidence suggested that these policies [of long prison sentences for drug offenders] may increase 
violence”).
273. See Rodríguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. 208, 209 (B.I.A. 1985).
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system’s severity revolution. Withholding claims should be focused on 
the individualized person and the risk she presents to the U.S. community 
instead of group-based assessments of dangerousness. The “tough on 
crime” mentality of the severity revolution274 should not stand in the way 
of U.S. treaty obligations to protect refugees.
One can argue that the lessons learned from the war on drugs do not 
apply in the PSC context. The war on drugs failed, many say, because it 
caused more harm than it prevented—namely, the harm to black 
communities because of the long sentences doled out primarily to young 
black men for drug-related offenses.275 Long sentences are not at issue in 
the PSC context. However, the harms are similar. Here, the communities 
from which immigrants are deported suffer in the loss of sister, daughter,
or mother; in fact, the community suffers even more because deportation 
is permanent.276 Also, communities suffer doubly from the deportation of 
a refugee because they potentially lose the person forever if she is killed 
upon deportation, as she fears. At a minimum, communities here suffer 
because they live with the anxiety that their sister, daughter, or mother is 
going to be persecuted in the country of deportation. Moreover, the goal 
of the PSC bar—protecting the U.S. community277—arguably is not 
served by deporting a drug trafficker. Unlike the noncitizen who may 
commit future violent crimes, someone who is likely to commit drug 
trafficking in the future still could engage in such activity from abroad, 
thus equally harming the U.S. community. As Attorney General Ashcroft 
noted, “international terrorists increasingly employ drug trafficking as 
one of their primary sources of funding.”278 Of course the low-level 
offenders (those who sell small amounts of drugs to finance their own 
habits) may be less inclined to engage in international drug trafficking, 
but some have questioned whether these offenders even should be 
included when we discuss the dangers presented by drug traffickers.279
                                                                                                                     
274. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 855.
275. See Bilz & Darley, supra note 272, at 1244–45; Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of 
the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 173–76 (1999) (discussing the 
competing harm arguments that proponents and opponents of the war on drugs have used); Levy-
Pounds, supra note 272, at 564–65.
276. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2012) (barring from admission any noncitizen who has 
previously been removed if convicted of an aggravated felony); id. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (categorizing 
drug trafficking as an aggravated felony); see also id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (barring from 
admission any person convicted of a controlled substance offense); id. § 1182(a)(2)(C) (barring 
from admission any person who the consular officer knows or has “reason to believe” is a drug 
trafficker); id. § 1182(h) (permitting a waiver of inadmissibility only for simple possession of 
thirty grams or less of marijuana for one’s own use).
277. See N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 339–41 (B.I.A. 2007).
278. Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 276 (B.I.A. 2002).
279. See Thomas E. Scott, Pretrial Detention Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984: An 
Empirical Analysis, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 32 (1989) (questioning harsh punishment for 
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This proposal also presents a commonsense solution that is faithful to 
the plain meaning of the statute; thus it would likely pass any 
reasonableness inquiry by a reviewing court.280 The plain meaning of 
“particularly serious” reveals the narrowness of this limited category of 
crimes. Congress chose to include not one but two modifiers of “crime”
in the withholding statute. “Particularly” means “in a special or unusual 
degree, to an extent greater than in other cases.”281 “Serious” means 
“excessive or impressive in quality, quantity, extent, or degree.”282 Also, 
“a ‘particularly serious crime’ must be more serious than a serious non-
political crime, itself already a limited category.”283 That an offense is 
serious enough to be punishable in the criminal code does not mean it is 
serious enough to be labeled a PSC. Rather, the adjective and adverb 
should mean something.
Instead of giving common sense meaning to the modifiers of “crime,”
the Board and Attorney General have decided crimes are PSCs because 
there is harm to a victim.284 Yet, in theory, for every crime, there is harm 
to a victim; otherwise it would not be punishable as a crime.285 For 
today’s PSC analysis, it does not matter that the harm is attenuated for 
the crime to trigger a PSC finding. Take, for example, drug trafficking.286
According to Attorney General Ashcroft, society is harmed because 
illegal drugs are sold, which causes people to die of overdoses or become 
                                                                                                                     
peripheral actors in the drug trade like drug mules and street salesmen, which the author, a U.S. 
district court judge, describes as “lower echelon offenders”).
280. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) 
(holding that if Congress is ambiguous in a statutory term, the court will defer to the agency’s 
interpretation so long as it is reasonable); see also Ahmetovic v. INS, 62 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 
1995) (finding that PSC is an ambiguous term for the purposes of the Chevron analysis).
281. Leon v. Kirkland, 403 F. App’x 268, 270 (9th Cir. 2010).
282. Serious, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/serious (last visited Apr. 3, 2017).
283. Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1031, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013).
284. See G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 343 (B.I.A. 2014) (“The presence or absence of harm 
to the victim is also a pertinent factor in evaluating whether a crime was particularly serious.”).
285. See, e.g., Bilz & Darley, supra note 272, at 1229 (“Crime inflicts harms on victims. 
Punishments are designed to ‘answer’ crimes by inflicting counter-harms on the 
offender. . . . Officially declaring a behavior a ‘crime’ amounts to recognition that the behavior 
causes harm.”); Harcourt, supra note 275, at 110, 192–93 (arguing that the harm principle, which 
justifies punishment only because there is a resulting harm, has proliferated to justify punishing 
so many activities—“activities that have traditionally been associated with moral offense”—that 
the original harm principle itself, which “was never equipped to determine the relative importance 
of harms,” is no longer useful); id. at 120–21 (introducing the harm principle by stating “[t]hat 
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859))).
286. See Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 275 (A.G. 2002).
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disabled by drug addiction.287 Those who are disabled by drug addiction 
harm society further by robbing people or property to feed their 
addiction.288 Society is further harmed because “a considerable amount 
of money is drained from the economy of the United States annually 
because of the unlawful trafficking in drugs.”289 Also, “[s]ubstantial 
violence is present at all levels of the distribution chain.”290 It is 
confounding that a crime with such an inchoate, indirect set of harms 
could be a PSC. If, for example, a noncitizen convicted of drug trafficking 
also robbed someone at gunpoint to support a drug habit, wouldn’t this 
lead to a separate conviction for armed robbery, which the Board has held 
was a PSC?291 Compare this inchoate set of harms to the Board’s decision 
in 1999 that alien smuggling was not a PSC.292 Although there was 
significant potential for bodily harm—the respondent hid a woman in a 
compartment built underneath the floor of a van—the “respondent did 
not, in fact, cause [the alien] harm.”293 The evolution of how the Board 
has defined a PSC, with respect to any harm that may have been caused 
(or could be caused), demonstrates how much the definition of PSC has 
been stretched.
Proposing a commonsense solution—one that focuses on violent 
conduct and a substantial amount of time spent in prison as a result—
finds backing in Supreme Court cases interpreting another crimmigration 
term of art, “aggravated felony.” Here, we see the Court appealing to 
notions of common sense in determining what fits in the aggravated 
felony category. For example, the Board held in 1999 that DUI offenses 
were crimes of violence, which would be an aggravated felony if the 
sentence imposed was at least one year.294 The Supreme Court, in a 
unanimous decision in 2004, decided, evoking common sense, that a DUI 
statute punishing negligence causing serious bodily injury was not a 
                                                                                                                     
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. (quoting U-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 327, 330 (B.I.A. 1991)).
290. Id. at 276.
291. See, e.g., L-S-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 973, 974–75 (B.I.A. 1997).
292. See L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 655 (B.I.A. 1999).
293. Id. at 654–56.
294. See Puente, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1006, 1006 (B.I.A. 1999); Magallanes, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1,
3 (B.I.A. 1998). Several circuit courts disagreed with the Board. See, e.g., United States v. 
Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a DUI is not a crime of 
violence and thus is not an aggravated felony); Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 207–08 (2d Cir. 
2001); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 611 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Chapa-Garza, 
243 F.3d 921, 926 (5th Cir. 2001). This prompted the Board to clarify that it only would find DUI 
offenses to be crimes of violence in the circuits that had not decided the issue. See Ramos, 23 I.
& N. Dec. 336, 339 (B.I.A. 2002). 
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crime of violence aggravated felony.295 Similarly in 2002, the Board held 
that felony possession of a controlled substance was a “drug trafficking”
aggravated felony.296 When the issue reached the Supreme Court, the 
Court reversed the Board, finding that the Board had failed to use 
common sense when interpreting what was a drug trafficking aggravated 
felony.297 The Court had a subsequent opportunity to opine on the 
interaction between drug laws and deportability298 and again found that 
the Board’s position lacked common sense.299 If “aggravated felony” can 
be defined by reference to common sense, why not do the same with 
“particularly serious crime?”
Why draw the line at violent offenses? Is this proposal just another 
example of labeling the violent offender, who is disproportionately a 
person of color,300 a danger whereas the white fraudster is not?301 There 
are good reasons to draw the line at violent offenses in the PSC analysis.
                                                                                                                     
295. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004); see also id. at 11 (“[W]e cannot 
forget that we ultimately are determining the meaning of the term ‘crime of violence.’ The 
ordinary meaning of this term, combined with § 16’s emphasis on the use of physical force against 
another person (or the risk of having to use such force in committing a crime), suggests a category
of violent, active crimes that cannot be said naturally to include DUI offenses.”).
296. Yanez-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 390, 397 (B.I.A. 2002). The Board reversed its prior 
decisions holding that, for uniformity purposes, offenses would only be aggravated felonies if the 
federal Controlled Substances Act punished them as felonies; simple possession of most offenses 
would not be punished as a felony in the federal system. See K-V-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1163, 1178
(B.I.A. 1999); Davis, 20 I. & N. Dec. 536, 539 (B.I.A. 1992); Barrett, 20 I. & N. Dec. 171, 173
(B.I.A. 1990).
297. See Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 54 (2006) (“Reading [the statute] the 
Government’s way, then, would often turn simple possession into trafficking, just what the 
English language tells us not to expect, and that result makes us very wary of the Government’s
position.”).
298. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 582 (2010) (holding that a second 
simple possession offense was not an aggravated felony within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(B) because it was not punished as a recidivist offense in the state).
299. See id. at 575 (citing Lopez, 549 U.S. at 54) (“Because the English language tells us that 
most aggravated felonies are punishable by sentences far longer than 10 days, and that mere 
possession of one tablet of Xanax does not constitute ‘trafficking,’ Lopez instructs us to be doubly 
wary of the Government’s position in this case.”).
300. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM: A MANUAL FOR PRACTITIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS 5 (2008) (discussing Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s Unified Crime Report, which reflects that 39% of violent crime arrests are of 
African Americans).
301. It is questionable that only white people commit fraud and financial crimes. See, e.g.,
Singh v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 2012) (demonstrating an example of a Jamaican 
national deportable for fraud offense); Pierre v. Holder, 588 F.3d 767, 770 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(providing an example of a Haitian national deportable for fraud offense); Conteh v. Gonzales, 
461 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2006) (providing an example of a Sierra Leonean national deportable for 
fraud offense). Of course, this assumes that nationals of Jamaica, Haiti, and Sierra Leone are not 
white.
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First, the inviolability of the body is a central concept of criminal law.302
As Alice Ristroph has written, “[t]he possibility of violent crime is a 
central source of legitimation for the criminal justice system. We humans 
are physically vulnerable creatures, and we expect law to provide a 
measure of protection.”303 To support her argument, Ristroph cites legal 
philosopher HLA Hart, who characterized efforts to protect vulnerable 
human bodies from physical injury as the “minimum content” of a legal 
system,304 and political philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who identified fear 
of violent death as so central to human psychology that it is the driving 
force behind the creation of political societies.305 Professor Henry Shue 
also has argued that the right to physical security of the person is a “basic 
right,” which prioritizes it above all other rights.306 Because the PSC bar 
stems from a desire to protect the public from dangerous individuals, 
which is a central goal of criminal law, the inviolability of the body at the 
heart of criminal law should be the same in PSC law.307 Second, although 
neuroscience suggests that people such as fraud victims who suffer 
emotional injuries can feel what is tantamount to physical pain,308 violent 
attacks on the human body causes both physical and emotional pain, 
because a person whose physical body is violated then feels great 
emotional pain that comes from a lack of security in one’s
surroundings.309 Third, deporting the violent offender actually protects 
                                                                                                                     
302. See Ristroph, supra note 2, at 612 (“The primary reason to have criminal laws, police 
forces, and prisons is to address the problem of violent crime. The system’s central purpose, in 
the public understanding, is not to enforce morality or even to deter purely self-regarding harmful 
behavior such as drug use. The system exists to protect public safety.”).
303. Id. at 611.
304. Id. (citing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 189 (1961)). 
305. Id. (citing HOBBES, supra note 2, at 138).
306. See HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCES, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
18–20 (2d ed. 1996).
307. See id.; supra Section I.B.
308. See Betsy J. Grey, The Future of Emotional Harm, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2605, 2623–
24 (2015) (“Both scientists and scholars have moved away from explanations that treat ‘mental’
and ‘physical’ as separate categories. Neuroscientists have begun to develop new models of 
looking at the interaction between mind and body.”); Francis X. Shen, Sentencing Enhancement 
and the Crime Victim’s Brain, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 405 (2014) (“There is no successful 
justification for treating mental injuries as categorically distinct from other physical injuries. 
There is, however, good reason for law to treat mental injuries as a unique type of physical 
injury.”); Shaun Cassin, Comment, Eggshell Minds and Invisible Injuries: Can Neuroscience 
Challenge Longstanding Treatment of Tort Injuries?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 929, 954 (2013) 
(“Neuroscience is making it harder to support a legal distinction between physical and emotional 
injuries.”).
309. See, e.g., Shen, supra note 308, at 432 (describing psychological injury to a rape victim, 
who, ‘“for over two years after the crimes occurred . . . has needed continuous psychological 
counseling and anti-depressant medication to help her overcome her constant fear of being 
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the U.S. community from a dangerous individual, since that person will 
physically be unable to commit a violent crime against a person from 
abroad. That offender can, however, continue to commit drug trafficking, 
financial crimes, or possession of child pornography from afar, so the 
U.S. community is not as protected when we deport this type of 
offender.310
Why implement a significant sentence requirement? This is one way 
of reversing the trend of mistrusting criminal judges that is seen in both 
PSC determinations and immigration law in general. That a criminal 
court judge actually required the convicted person to spend some time in 
prison is highly instructive of the person’s dangerousness. If a criminal 
judge decided this person should go free, the immigration system should 
trust that judge, if for no other reason that it is inefficient for the 
immigration judge to repeat a finding made by a criminal court judge.311
Of course, in many cases, criminal judges’ hands are tied by mandatory 
minimum sentences. However, the Supreme Court and Congress have 
chipped away at certain aspects of the severity revolution’s harsh 
sentencing policies.312 As the critics of mandatory minimums gain more 
traction,313 PSC determinations will feel the impact. It is also true that the 
sentence an offender served is often less of a product of the criminal 
judge, and more of a product of plea negotiations with the prosecutor.314
In the plea bargain cases, this Article’s proposal then asks the Board (who 
serves under the Attorney General) or Attorney General to trust a fellow 
                                                                                                                     
attacked and to help her function on a daily basis”’ (quoting State v. Arnett, 49 S.W.3d 250, 261 
(Tenn. 2001))).
310. See supra notes 277–79 and accompanying text.
311. Cf. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2013) (defending the categorical 
approach, the elements-based mechanism for deciding whether a criminal conviction renders a 
noncitizen deportable, by listing its practical purposes, one of which is that “[i]t promotes judicial 
and administrative efficiency by precluding the relitigation of past convictions in minitrials 
conducted long after the fact”). 
312. See, e.g., Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.) (eliminating sentencing disparity between 
crack and powder cocaine); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–37 (2005) (holding that 
that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, when instructing judges to make factual findings to 
calculate increases in applicable sentencing ranges, violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial by 
jury).
313. See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 219, at 295–96 (describing the effect of Booker as making 
the sentencing guidelines “ceilings rather than rules,” which restored discretion to federal 
sentencing, and arguing that this “state of affairs offers a useful model for a kind of sentencing 
law that might push prison populations down rather than up”); David Yellen, What Juvenile Court 
Abolitionists Can Learn from the Failures of Sentencing Reforms, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 577, 583–
84 (“[T]here is near unanimity among commentators, judges, and even the United States 
Sentencing Commission that mandatory minimums are failures, imposing unduly harsh sentences 
in many cases and inviting evasion and manipulation.”).
314. See García Hernández, supra note 6, at 1497, 1499–1500.
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prosecutor to not offer such a lenient sentence to someone who is a 
danger to the community.
Another critique of relying on criminal court judges’ sentences is that 
criminal court judges suffer from implicit bias, judging young black 
males to be more dangerous and requiring long prison sentences to 
protect society.315 A proposal that uses these criminal court sentences as 
a basis for deciding who merits refugee protection allows what many 
deem a racist system of criminal justice to inject racism into refugee 
determinations.316 However, criminal justice actors are far ahead of their 
immigration colleagues in the training they receive on implicit bias.317
Since criminal judges have received more training than immigration 
                                                                                                                     
315. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2009) (reporting results of a study of trial judges, which 
demonstrated that judges hold implicit racial biases, these biases can influence their judgment, 
but that judges can, in some instances, compensate for their implicit biases); id. at 1202 (“Each of 
these judgments [concerning bail, pretrial motions, evidentiary issues, witness credibility, and so 
forth] could be influenced by implicit biases, so the cumulative effect on bottom-line statistics 
like incarceration rates and sentence length is much larger than one might imagine.”); see also
Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially 
Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1314 (2002) (discussing the 
stereotypical association between African Americans and violence).
316. Professor César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández discusses how, in the post-Civil Rights 
Act era, deeply ingrained racial biases that dominated U.S. history were repackaged in the 
supposedly race-neutral criminal justice system. García Hernández, supra note 6, at 1493–97. He 
argues that the immigration system followed this pattern; instead of keeping out entire racial 
groups as had happened in earlier years, decisions about who to admit or deport turned on “facially 
neutral” criminal histories. Id. at 1503, 1509; see also Rebecca Sharpless, Clear and Simple 
Deportation Rules for Crimes: Why We Need Them and Why It’s Hard to Get Them, 92 DENV. U.
L. REV. 933, 935–36 n.8 (2015) (citing articles that discuss racial and other discrimination in 
sentencing).
317. “The National Campaign to Ensure the Racial and Ethnic Fairness of America’s State 
Courts was launched in 2006 to mobilize the significant expertise, experience, and commitment 
of state court judges and court officers to ensure both the perception and reality of racial and 
ethnic fairness in the nation's state courts.” PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, HELPING COURTS ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS i (2012), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/
PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/IB_report_033012.ashx. As part of this 
campaign, state court judges were specifically trained about implicit bias in decision-making. See
id. In contrast, The Ethics and Professionalism Guide for Immigration Judges states that judges 
should not manifest bias in a proceeding. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM GUIDE FOR IMMIGRATION JUDGES IX 3 (2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/05/23/EthicsandProfessionalismGuid
eforIJs.pdf. However, there does not appear to be any training for immigration judges to recognize 
and avoid implicit bias in their decision-making even though, as both Immigration Judge Dana 
Leigh Marks and immigration scholar Fatma Marouf have noted, the conditions are ripe for 
implicit bias in their decisions. See Dana Leigh Marks, Who, Me? Am I Guilty of Implicit Bias?,
54 A.B.A. JUDGES’ J. 20, 21 (2015); Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 417, 440 (2011).
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judges, they are better able to recognize their biases and correct for them 
in discretionary decisions such as sentencing.318
What is a “significant” sentence? A bright-line rule that this Article 
proposes is that the noncitizen actually have served five years in prison.319
This five-year cutoff is contained in the current PSC statutory language, 
as Congress intended for aggravated felonies with five-year sentences to 
be per se PSCs.320 Additionally, this cutoff has precedent in immigration 
law, as it tracks the old law of the 212(c) waiver.321 The 212(c) waiver, 
which no longer exists in immigration law, was previously available to 
long-term permanent residents who could show that their equities 
outweighed the negative factors in their life such as a criminal record.322
It was only available, however, to those who had served less than five 
years for an aggravated felony conviction.323 This provides an example 
of deferring to criminal sentencing judges that hardly exists in 
immigration law; it would be a good idea to bring back this piece of 
212(c) law into PSC determinations.
What, then, of others’ proposals to correct the PSC test? Others have 
argued for a balancing test; this Article will not recreate that debate.324
                                                                                                                     
318. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 315, at 1197.
319. Professor Rebecca Sharpless has proposed a similar five-year sentence cutoff in her 
article arguing that deportation proceedings should not be initiated for any noncitizen convicted 
of a crime unless that person has received a five-year sentence. Sharpless, supra note 316, at 956.
She argues that such a bright-line cutoff injects transparency and notice into the deportation 
system, which allows more public confidence in the system. Id. at 952–53. Additionally, such 
rules offer cost savings to the overburdened immigration court system, since the decisions will be 
easier to administer. Id. at 953.
320. See Blandino-Medina v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338, 1344, 1345 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(interpreting INA to establish only one category of per se particularly serious crimes, aggravated 
felonies with five-year sentences, and the agency must conduct a case-by-case analysis for all 
other crimes).
321. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976). While the 212(c) waiver originally was available to any 
long-term lawful permanent resident who had an aggravated felony conviction, the Immigration 
Act of 1990 barred 212(c) relief from residents who served more than five years for an aggravated 
felony. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.
322. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295–97 (2001); Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584–85
(B.I.A. 1978).
323. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976).
324. See generally Delgado, supra note 8, at 18; cf. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 14, at 106 
(“In practice, the claim to be a refugee can rarely be ignored, for a balance must also be struck 
between the nature of the offence presumed to have been committed and the degree of persecution 
feared.”); 1 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 297–98
(1996); WEIS, supra note 36, at 342 (“The principle of proportionality has to be observed, that is, 
in the words of the UK representative at the Conference, whether the danger entailed to the refugee 
by expulsion or return outweighs the menace to public security that would arise if he were 
permitted to stay.”); Nadia Yakoob, Political Offender or Serious Criminal? Challenging the 
Interpretation of ‘Serious, Nonpolitical Crimes’ in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
545, 564–65 (2000).
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The Supreme Court, however, has disagreed with this approach, as has 
the Board.325 In INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,326 the Court held that when 
interpreting the serious nonpolitical crime bar to withholding, there 
should be no balancing of the risk of persecution against the seriousness 
of the harm.327 Although that was not a PSC case, the Court upheld the 
Board’s decision in Rodriguez-Coto328 that in deciding whether an 
offense is either a serious nonpolitical crimes or a PSC, there should be 
no balancing of the risk of persecution against the seriousness of the 
crime.329 Proponents of the balancing test present strong moral 
arguments, although “even its strongest proponents do not claim that the 
balancing test is a mandatory requirement of law”; rather, the balancing 
test is less controversial if seen as a “humanitarian cross-check.”330 In 
fact, there may be some unofficial humanitarian cross-checking going on 
behind the scenes of an immigration judge’s decision when deciding 
PSC.331
Some also have argued for a separate determination of 
dangerousness,332 calling on the Board to overrule its decision in 
                                                                                                                     
325. See Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. 208, 209 (B.I.A. 1985); cf. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 
526 U.S. 415, 426 (1999) (upholding the Board’s decision in Rodriguez-Coto that for a serious 
nonpolitical crime determination it is not necessary to weigh the risk of persecution). 
326. 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
327. Id. at 426.
328. 19 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 1985).
329. See id. at 209.
330. Michael Kingsley Nyinah, Exclusion Under Article 1F: Some Reflections on Context, 
Principles and Practice, 12 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 295, 307 (2000); see also id. (raising questions 
as to whether there can truly be “degrees of persecution” and why two refugees who committed 
the same offense can be treated differently, for the purposes of the serious nonpolitical crime 
exception, if one suffered more persecution than the other).
331. In an example from the author’s practice, one client presented significant evidence of 
the likelihood of his persecution, yet had several assault with a dangerous weapon offenses, which 
under the Board’s earliest case law would likely be a PSC. See, e.g., B-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 427, 430–
31 (B.I.A. 1991) (holding that aggravated battery involving a firearm was a PSC). However,
neither the Department of Homeland Security trial attorney nor the immigration judge raised the 
issue, even though the PSC issue was argued and briefed for the case. The client was granted 
withholding of removal. See L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 653–54 (B.I.A. 1999) (“A determination 
that a crime is ‘particularly serious’ cannot . . . be made in a vacuum. It must take into account 
that an alien convicted of such a crime, and therefore excluded from applying for relief under 
section 241(b)(3), could be an alien who would otherwise meet the burden of proof for this relief 
and thus would be subject to persecution when removed from the United States.”).
332. The separate determination of dangerousness finds support from international refugee 
law experts and other countries’ interpretations of the Refugee Convention. See, e.g., JAMES C.
HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 344 (2005) (“Beyond [a PSC 
determination], there must also be a determination that the offender ‘constitutes a danger to the 
community.”’); Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 43, at 140 (“An additional assessment is 
called for which will hinge on an appreciation of issues of fact such as the nature and 
circumstances of the particularly serious crime for which the individual was convicted, when the 
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Carballe.333 An early critic of this separate determination of 
dangerousness, Judge Robert Vance of the Eleventh Circuit, discussed 
the administrative difficulties of such a separate determination of 
dangerousness, stating that it “would require a prediction as to the alien’s
potential for recidivism and would lead to extensive, drawn-out hearings 
complete with psychological evaluations and expert testimony.”334 In 
other areas of law where predictions of dangerousness must be made,335
psychiatrists and other mental health professionals have argued how 
unpredictable these are, making the point that “the prediction of 
dangerous behavior is an ‘empirical quicksand’ and that psychology and 
psychiatry should get clear of it as expeditiously as possible.”336 The 
Supreme Court, however, has held that such psychological predictions 
about dangerousness can be made in death penalty cases (although U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun strongly disagreed).337 The 
                                                                                                                     
crime in question was committed, evidence of recidivism or likely recidivism, etc.”); see also EN 
(Serbia) v. Secretary of the Home Department (2010) QB 633 (UK) (ruling by the United 
Kingdom Queen’s Bench stating that “Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention imposed on a state 
wishing [to expel a refugee] both the requirement that the person had been convicted by final 
judgment of a [PSC] and the requirement that he constitute a danger to the community”); 
Pushpanathan v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 982, ¶ 12 (Can.)
(Canadian Supreme Court ruling that, when interpreting the Refugee Convention’s PSC 
determination, the government must “make the added determination that the person poses a 
danger to the safety of the public or to the security of the country . . . to justify refoulement.”); In 
re Tamayo & Department of Immigration (1994) 37 ALD 786, ¶ 20 (Austl.) (ruling by the 
Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal stating that the reference in Article 33(2) of the 
convention to “a refugee who ‘constitutes a danger to the community of that (refuge) country’ is 
similarly concerned with the risk of recidivism,” so a refugee’s personal circumstances must be 
considered insofar as they affect the possibility of recidivism and the danger to the community).
333. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 8, at 12–14; McGarry, supra note 8.
334. Zardui-Quintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d 1213, 1222–23 (11th Cir. 1985) (Vance, J., 
concurring).
335. See Elyce Zenoff, Controlling the Dangers of Dangerousness: The ABA Standards and 
Beyond, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562, 562–63 n.2 (1985) (citing S.A. Shah, Dangerousness: 
Conceptual Prediction and Public Policy Issues, in VIOLENCE AND THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 151,
153–54 (J. Hays, T. Roberts & K. Solway eds., 1981)) (listing examples of dangerous 
determinations in the law).
336. DANGEROUSNESS: PROBABILITY AND PREDICTION, PSYCHIATRY AND PUBLIC POLICY 2
(Christopher D. Webster et al. eds., 1985); see also Jack Williams, Process and Prediction: A 
Return to a Fuzzy Model of Pretrial Detention, 79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 334 (1994) (“The consensus 
among experts is that clinical predictions of dangerousness, like court decisions, are inferior to 
statistical predictions.”).
337. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983) (“The suggestion that no psychiatrist’s
testimony may be presented with respect to a defendant’s future dangerousness is somewhat like 
asking us to disinvent the wheel.”). But see id. at 928 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Psychiatric 
predictions of future dangerousness are not accurate; wrong two times out of three, their probative 
value, and therefore any possible contribution they might make to the ascertainment of truth, is 
virtually nonexistent.”).
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separate determination of dangerousness can be made in immigration 
law—in fact it is made on a daily basis in bond hearings, as the judge 
must consider first and foremost whether the noncitizen is a danger to 
people or property.338
Given the steep uphill battle of overruling the Supreme Court, Board, 
and every circuit court, this Article posits that we do not need to go so 
far. Even without a balancing test or separate determination of 
dangerousness, the problems highlighted in this Article can be corrected 
if PSC is narrowly limited to violent offenses where the offender served 
significant prison time. The solution proposed in this Article would allow 
the immigration judge to focus exclusively on dangerousness, as opposed 
to requiring a balancing test. The solution also would allow the 
immigration judge to focus on the nature and circumstances of the crime 
in question as opposed to trying to predict future dangerousness.
However, the solution would largely place the decision of who is 
dangerous with two important players: the criminal judge and criminal 
law. The proposal relies on criminal judges, by trusting them to sort out 
the dangerous criminals for the most prison time, and criminal law, by 
using violence—“the old-fashioned, physically harmful kind”—as a 
proxy for dangerousness.339
CONCLUSION
“[T]he line must be drawn so that ‘particularly serious crimes’ are not 
a major proportion of crimes generally.”340 The Ninth Circuit’s words of 
wisdom provide a refreshing change from the PSC law trends of the past 
decade and a half, which have led many refugees to be deported without 
any consideration of their fear of persecution. This Article has sought to 
explain why PSC has broadened beyond recognition by using the term’s
expansion as an example of the mistrust of criminal judges in 
immigration law, a trend that mirrors aspects of criminal law’s severity 
revolution. It is time for the Board or Attorney General to reverse the 
trends in PSC law that have allowed nonviolent crimes to be PSCs. This 
will allow immigration judges to see refugees for what they are: 
individuals in need of protection, not dangerous criminals in need of 
deportation.
                                                                                                                     
338. See Urena, 25 I. & N. Dec. 140, 141 (B.I.A. 2009) (citing 8 C.F.R. 1236.1(c)(8) (2009),
which governs determinations of bond made by ICE, for the suggestion that “danger to the 
community” means danger to property or persons); Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1113 (B.I.A.
1999).
339. Ristroph, supra note 2, at 618 (“If the criminal law does best when violence—the old-
fashioned, physically harmful kind—is involved, then perhaps the law needs a renewed focus on 
‘true’ violence.”).
340. Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1031, 1048 (9th Cir. 2013).
